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Abstract 
 
 
 Does efficient internal investment generally translate into successful external investment 
activities? In this research we use the internal capital allocation efficiency as a proxy for the 
efficiency of internal investment, and study whether firms that are internally efficient also make 
efficient external investment decisions. Our sample consists of multi-segment acquirers that 
announce acquisitions between 1986 and 2003 (only completed deals are included). We estimate 
short-term and long-term abnormal performance, excess value and operating performance around 
mergers in order to measure the success of acquisitions (external investment decisions). Our 
results indicate that internal capital allocation efficiency is indeed a significant factor in the 
success of acquisition.  Firms that are internally efficient also make efficient external investment 
decisions. Conversely, internally inefficient firms are also externally inefficient. Thus, our results 
indicate that internal efficiency can be used as a predictor of the success and efficiency of 
external investment decisions.  
 
 
 
Key words: internal capital market, acquisition, excess value. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
Despite the controversial views on whether mergers contribute to or erode firm value, acquisition 
activities have never faded out of the market since their emergence. Decades of experience tells 
us that while some of the acquisitions may turn out to be great success, others result in disastrous 
loss. Can we successfully predict good acquisitions from bad ones? Since acquisitions can be 
viewed as major investment decisions, our view is that efficient internal investment generally 
translates into successful external investment activities (thus mergers, in our study). In this study 
we use the internal capital allocation (ICM) efficiency as a proxy for the efficiency of internal 
investment; therefore our sample consists of multi-segment acquirers who have announced 
acquisitions between years 1986 and 2003 (only completed deals are included). Our study aims 
at investigating whether firms that are efficient in their internal capital allocation are also 
efficient and therefore successful in their external investment decisions. Conversely, are 
internally inefficient firms also inefficient in their external investment activities? As a counter-
argument to this ―management efficiency‖ hypothesis, Roll‘s (1986) hubris theory implies that a 
series of successful investment could lead to overconfidence. If overconfidence does play a key 
role in firms‘ acquisition transactions, then firms with successful pre-acquisition investment 
activities may overpay their acquisition targets, which may result in more value loss for the 
acquirers.   
 
One added feature of conglomerate firms as compared to focused firms is the existence of 
internal capital markets. There have been ample studies over the last two decades about whether 
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internal capital markets contribute to or erode firm value. The efficient internal capital markets 
hypothesis argues that since headquarters face credit constraints, the creation of internal capital 
markets add to firm value by facilitating headquarters in winner-picking (Stein, 1997). On the 
other hand, the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis argues that rent-seeking behavior 
of divisional managers will result in inefficient cross-subsidization across divisions, which is 
detrimental to firm value (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).   
 
It is a consensus that investment decisions are probably the most important decisions facing a 
firm. Since managers are inclined to distort investment decisions towards their personal benefits 
when conflict of interest occurs between managers and shareholders, efficient firms, in order to 
maximize shareholder value, have to ensure both quality managers and effective monitoring 
forces or incentive schemes to induce and enforce the best investment decisions by managers. 
Efficient internal capital allocation, thus, reflects that despite the negative aspects of internal 
capital markets and conglomeration, these firms have found an efficient balance between 
sufficient monitoring and sufficient incentivizing of managers to induce efficient allocation 
decisions internally. In this research, we study whether such ―efficient‖ firms also make efficient 
decisions with regard to their external investment. Thus our research complements extant studies 
on the impact of governance and managerial incentives on efficiency and success of acquisitions. 
We argue that internal allocation efficiency is a consequence of balance between efficient 
governance and sufficient incentivizing. So by using our metric of internal efficiency, we are 
able to simultaneously incorporate and control for effective governance and incentives in our 
analysis.  
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Using the efficiency of internal capital allocations (the measure for internal capital allocation is 
discussed in detail in section IV), we classify firms as first being active or inactive (firms that 
have made zero internal funds subsidy or transfer among different segments are classified as 
internal capital allocation inactive firms). The active firms are further classified as efficient or 
inefficient. Hereafter, we will refer to firms with efficient internal capital allocations as ―ICM 
efficient firms‖, firms with inefficient internal capital allocations as ―ICM inefficient firms‖, and 
firms with inactive internal capital allocations as ―ICM inactive firms.‖ 
 
We estimate short-term and long-term abnormal performance, excess value and operating 
performance in order to measure the success of external investment decisions. Specifically, we 
mainly aim at answering the following: 1) Event period abnormal returns - are firms with 
efficient internal capital allocation more likely to make successful acquisitions? 2) Is the market 
efficient enough to absorb all the effects of the acquisitions at or around the announcement, or is 
the effect spread over a longer period? 3) Do firms with efficient internal allocation have higher 
excess values than inefficient firms? How does the excess value change around the acquisitions? 
4) And finally we investigate whether operating performance improves post-acquisition for firms 
with efficient internal capital allocation.  
 
In our first hypothesis, we measure the efficiency or success of acquisition using abnormal return 
around the acquisition announcement. If efficient internal capital allocators also make efficient 
external investment decisions, we would expect the abnormal returns to be positive and/or higher 
for the group relative to the inefficient internal capital allocators. Our results show that the mean 
cumulative abnormal return (market model, equally weighted index) within event window (-3, 
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+3) is -0.54% (significant at the 1% level) for the ICMS (ICM based on net subsidy within a 
firm) inefficient firms; -0.57% (significant at the 5% level) for the ICMS inactive firms; and 
2.26% (significant at 5%) for the ICMS efficient firms. This is consistent with our predictions. 
To further investigate whether method of payment and relatedness play an important role in the 
announcement period CARs, we conduct sub-group event studies within each ICM efficiency 
group. The results show that at least for our sample of multi-segment acquirers, the effects of the 
internal capital allocation efficiency on announcement period CAR dominate those of method of 
payment and relatedness. A further regression with the acquirer‘s standardized CAR for event 
window (-3, +3) as the dependent variable, and independent variables including a dummy for 
ICMS efficiency as well as ICMS inefficiency, a dummy for all cash financing, and a dummy for 
relatedness of the merger, as well as other control variables, reinforces the above findings.   
 
The second main hypothesis is that ICM efficient (inefficient) firms are expected to earn non-
significant post-acquisition long-run abnormal returns. This implies that the market is efficient 
and quick in adjusting stock prices to new information. Nevertheless, if significant results are 
obtained, it could be interpreted as market under- or over-react to the acquisition announcements, 
or not all the information is available at the time of making the announcements. Using a 
calendar-time portfolio approach, our results do not show significant mispricing in the three 
years following the completion of the acquisitions. This is indicative that the market is rather 
efficient in absorbing the effects of the acquisitions at or around their announcements. We also 
interpret this result as suggesting that the market correctly perceives the nature of the acquisition 
and fully incorporates the ability of the acquirer into their pricing.  
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As part of our third hypothesis, we measure the efficiency or success of acquisition using the 
change in excess value. If efficient internal allocators also make efficient external investment 
decisions, we would expect to see excess value increase from pre to post acquisition for these 
acquirers. Results from this part of analysis bring us some surprises. The evidence shows that 
pre-acquisition both efficient and inefficient firms have lower excess values compared to the 
inactive firms. However, three years after the merger announcement, the excess values of the 
inefficient and inactive group decrease, whereas that of the efficient group increases, although 
none of them is significant. Between-group comparison shows that ICM inactive firms are 
having significantly higher mean excess value compared to the ICM inefficient firms and ICM 
efficient firms at the fiscal year end before the acquisition announcement. However, three years 
after the acquisition, the difference in excess value between ICM inactive and ICM efficient 
firms becomes insignificant; whereas the excess value of the ICM inefficient firms are 
significantly lower compared to the ICM inactive firms (using both sales and asset multiples) and 
ICM efficient firms (using asset multiples). Therefore, the ICM efficient firms seem to be 
catching up with the inactive firms (in terms of excess values) three years after the merger 
announcement. To detect whether prior internal capital allocation efficiency is a main contributor 
to the change in excess values, we regress the acquirer‘s change in excess values on several 
dummy variables (including ICM efficiency as well as ICM inefficiency, all cash financing, and 
relatedness of the merger) as well as various control variables. Regression results show that the 
coefficient on the efficient internal capital allocation dummy is significantly greater than zero 
when excess value is based on sales multiples. These results tell us again that the internal capital 
efficient firms make value enhancing external investment decisions, which lead to an increase in 
their excess value post-acquisition.  
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Finally we investigate the acquirer‘s operating performance before and following acquisitions.  
We use two measures of operating performance: the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation to total assets (EBITD/AT) and the ratio of sales to total assets (SALE/AT).  We 
examine the operating performance of the acquirers in the pre-announcement year and in three 
years after the announcement year to make the results comparable to those from the excess value 
analysis. Results show that the ICM inactive firms have significantly higher EBITD/AT ratio 
than both the ICM inefficient and efficient firms in the pre-announcement year. However, these 
differences become insignificant three years after the announcement year; moreover, the ICM 
efficient firms have the higher operating performance compared to the inactive firms post-
acquisition. Regressions with the change in operating performance from pre-announcement year 
to three years after indicate that the coefficient on the inefficient internal capital allocation 
dummy is significantly less than zero. Thus, while internal capital efficiency does not necessarily 
enhance operating performance, they do not erode it either. Inefficient firms on the other hand 
erode operating performance post-acquisition.  
 
The next section discusses relevant previous studies. Section III describes the hypotheses. Data 
and the construction of variables are discussed in section IV. Section V presents the 
methodology and results. Finally, section VI concludes.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions: Theory and Evidence  
Mergers can generally fit into one of the three categories: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. 
A horizontal merger combines firms that operate in the same lines of businesses. A vertical 
merger combines firms that are involved in different stages of the production or marketing 
process, such as a merger with a supplier or a customer. And a conglomerate merger is a 
combination of unrelated firms, which is also called diversified companies.  
 
Motives for firms‘ acquisition transactions broadly fall into two groups. Supporters of 
management utility maximization hypothesis argue that managers may overpay the acquisition 
targets in order to realize personal gains at the expense of shareholders. There are no expected 
economic gains for this type of acquisitions. Although it does not preclude target firms from 
obtaining positive abnormal returns, they come as a loss for the acquiring firms‘ shareholders.  
 
On the other hand, supporters of the shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis view 
acquisitions as value enhancing for the acquiring firms. This implies a positive expected 
economic gain from the acquisition. Although the distribution of the economic gains between the 
acquirer and the target depends on the competitiveness of the acquisition market, the acquiring 
firm‘s shareholders are expected to earn a normal rate of return at least. Several motivations are 
consistent with the shareholder value maximization view. First, financial motivations hold that 
since either the acquirer or the target may possess excess cash, acquisitions provides an 
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opportunity to rearrange these excess cash more efficiently; or that acquisitions may reduce the 
expected bankruptcy costs of the new entity by reducing the probability of default and increase 
its debt capacity. Second, economic motivations are mainly stressing the gains accrued from 
economies of scale or economies of scope. Third, if the acquirer has information concerning the 
target firm that is not available to others in the market, it may take advantage of this asymmetric 
information by conducting acquisitions. And fourth, acquisitions could be undertaken out of the 
desire for corporate control. Due to differential efficiency in managerial abilities, acquisitions 
can create value by replacing an incompetent management in the target firm or by enacting a 
value maximizing strategy.  
 
Event returns, based on market model adjusted for beta risk, broadly show the following 
patterns: targets earn positive 20-25% event returns in mergers, in contrast to positive 30-40% in 
tender offers; buyers earn positive 1-2% event returns in mergers, compared to negative 1-2% in 
tender offers
1
.  
 
Recent market-timing models posit that misvaluation drives mergers (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). It implies that if the target is less overvalued 
than the acquirer, the acquiring firm‘s long-term shareholders can benefit from the stock-
financed acquisitions even if no real synergy is realized.  Savor and Lu (2009) and Rhodes–
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) find evidence supporting this hypothesis.  
 
Roll‘s (1986) hubris theory links takeover activities with the winner‘s curse. It implies that firms 
with successful past experience are more likely to be influenced by hubris. Malmendier and Tate 
                                                 
1
 Weston, J. Fred, and Samuel C. Weaver, Mergers and Acquisitions, McGraw-Hill, 2001. P94. 
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(2008) find evidence that when CEOs become overconfident, they may overestimate their ability 
to generate returns and therefore engage in value-destroying acquisitions by overpaying the 
target. And this effect becomes stronger when overconfident CEOs have enough internally 
generated funds to finance the acquisition.  
 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) investigate whether bad acquisitions are driven by 
managerial objectives, i.e. bidder firms with ―bad managers‖ systematically overpay in 
acquisitions in pursuit of personal objectives other than maximizing shareholders‘ value. They 
conclude ―firms with bad managers (identified by poor firm performance relative to its industry) 
do much worse in making acquisitions than firms with good managers,‖ and the negative return 
to acquirers with bad managers shows a ―manifestation of agency problems in the firm.‖ These 
findings are inconsistent with a particular version of the hubris hypothesis for acquisitions, which 
predicts that ―managers of better performing firms are more arrogant and therefore overestimate 
the target‘s value under their control by more.‖ 
 
Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) review the literature on long-run stock returns following acquisitions, 
and conclude that the long-run performance is negative following acquisitions and is non-
negative (and perhaps even positive) following tender offers (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 
1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). The sample of Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992) covers the period from 1955 to 1987; Loughran and Vijh‘s (1997) sample 
ranges from 1970 to 1989; and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) investigate the sample period between 
1980 and 1991.    
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Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) also review the literature on the four explanations for the post-merger 
underperformance, namely the speed of adjustment, the EPS myopia, the method of payment, 
and the performance extrapolation explanations. Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) argue that 
the negative post-acquisition abnormal return may be due to the slow adjustment of the market to 
the news of acquisitions. However, they do not find evidence to support the speed of adjustment 
explanation. Since acquiring a target with a lower price-earnings ratio than the acquirer‘s by 
paying with shares may result in an inflation of the acquirer‘s EPS, the EPS myopia hypothesis 
predicts that managers might be more willing to overpay for this type of acquisitions. The market 
might overvalue these acquirers initially which results in a negative post-acquisition performance 
for these firms. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) empirically test the EPS myopia hypothesis but fail to 
find supporting evidence.   
 
Since firms may tend to issue shares when their stocks are overvalued, while use debt or retained 
earnings to finance when their stocks are undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the method of 
payment hypothesis expect equity prices to drop following stock acquisitions. While recent 
studies generally support this hypothesis, the method of payment explanation is still 
controversial to a certain degree. Many studies (Franks, Harris and Mayer, 1988; Gregory, 1997; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) document stronger performance 
following acquisitions financed by cash rather than equity; nevertheless, Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991) report insignificant results.  
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find strong evidence supporting the performance extrapolation 
hypothesis, which argues that managers of ‗glamour‘ firms are more likely to be infected by 
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hubris (Roll, 1986). They conclude ―the long-term underperformance of acquiring firms in 
mergers is not uniform across firms. It is predominantly caused by the poor post-acquisition 
performance of low book-to-market ‗glamour‘ acquirers,‖ and ―this conclusion is independent of 
the method of payment.‖  
   
2.2 Conglomerate Mergers and “Diversification Discount” 
If looking at the motivations for firms‘ diversification decision, we can largely classify them into 
three groups. First, the market-power hypothesis argues that firms diversify because they are 
seeking for the ―conglomerate power‖. Second, firms may diversify in order to exploit their 
excess capacity in their resources, such as their firm-specific knowledge or service or other 
productive factors. And third, the agency hypothesis says that in the absence of significant 
ownership stakes, managers may pursue value-reducing strategies to further their own interests at 
the expense of the firm‘s owners. And conglomerate mergers seem to be a convenient way for 
them to realize these purposes.  
 
There is mixed empirical evidence with regard to the conglomerate mergers. There seems to be 
little evidence supporting the market power hypothesis (Berry, 1974; Caves, 1981).  Moreover, a 
diversification discount is widely documented in the literature. For example, Lang and Stulz 
(1994) find a negative relationship between firm diversification and Tobin‘s q throughout 1980s. 
They further document that the Tobin‘s q is lower for diversifies firms compared to specialized 
firms.  Berger and Offek (1995) show evidence that during 1986-1991, diversified firms are 
traded at an average 13% to 15% discount compared to the sum of the imputed values of their 
segments. Taking the cyclical effect into consideration, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) 
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provide evidence that mean return in related and unrelated acquisitions were not statistically or 
substantively different in the 1970s, but were so in the 1980s. Matsusaka (1993) find that 
market‘s responses to unrelated acquisitions were positive in the 1960s, neutral in the 1970s, and 
negative in the 1980s.  
 
The agency cost view is at large consistent with the diversification discount. Some value-
reducing agency problems include the following. 1) Value losses from overinvestment and cross-
subsidization (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000).  (An extended review on internal capital market will be discussed in the next section.) 2) 
―Free cash flow‖ problem proposed by Jensen (1986). Jensen defines free cash flow as the cash 
flow in excess of that required to fund all positive net present values (NPV) projects. Since 
managers‘ control power as well as their compensation is linked to firm size, managers have 
incentives to grow their firms in excess of their value-maximizing level. Consistent with this 
view, Harford (1999) documents that cash-rich firms make value-decreasing acquisitions, and 
the acquisitions by these firms are more likely to be diversifying ones. Lang, Stulz, and Walking 
(1991) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) also provide consistent results. 3) Management 
entrenchment and empire building problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Denis, Denis, and 
Sarin, 1997; Amibud and Lev, 1981). Managers have an incentive to diversify into the lines of 
businesses in which they have a specialized skill or knowledge in order to entrench their 
management.  
 
The resource view reflects an underlying heterogeneity of firms‘ resources. Firms with less 
valuable resources may diversify more than firms with more valuable resources. Some studies 
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related to the resource view include Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1992), Nelson and Winter 
(1982), and Teece (1982). Studies trying to relate the diversification activity with the 
macroeconomic situations find that antitrust restraints could have channeled growth by domestic 
firms in the direction of diversification (Baker, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). There are also 
evidences that support the self-selection of diversified firms – as well as the self-selection of 
refocusing firms (Campa and Kedia, 2002).  
 
2.3 Internal Capital Markets and Conglomerate Firm Value 
The agency cost view is at large consistent with the diversification discount. One source of the 
agency costs is that divisional managers will involve in value-reducing rent-seeking activities, 
resulting in inefficient internal capital markets. A growing body of research addresses how 
overinvestment and inefficient cross-subsidization may result in the ―diversification discount‖ 
for conglomerate firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2000).  Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a two-tiered agency model to show how 
rent-seeking behavior of division managers may lead to inefficient cross-subsidies in internal 
capital markets. They argue that large socialist-type inefficiencies are more likely to occur when 
the divisions have a great deal of divergence in their strength, and when the CEO has low-
powered incentives. Studies that provide evidences for the costs of internal capital markets 
include: Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2001), Lamont (1997), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 
(2000), Scharfstein (1998), and Shin and Stulz (1998).  
 
On the other hand, internal capital markets can also contribute to firm value. Supporters of the 
efficient internal capital markets argue that since the headquarters have better information about 
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the investment opportunities than external suppliers of capital, internal capital markets are more 
efficient than external capital markets. Stein (1997) constructs a model in which internal capital 
market creates value by headquarters doing ―winner picking‖. External capital market, being 
aware of the agency problem existing within a firm, will provide binding credit constraints to 
prevent overinvestment. Thus headquarters will tilt capital resource toward winners‘ projects. If 
efficient cross-subsidization is implemented, the creation of an efficient internal capital market 
will enhance firm value. Hubbard and Palia (1999), Khanna and Tice (2001), and Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2002) find evidence that firms benefits from the existence of internal capital 
markets.   
 
In this paper we study whether efficiency along one dimension of decision-making translates into 
efficiency along other dimensions of decision-making. Specifically, we study whether firms that 
make efficient internal investment decisions also make efficient external investment decisions.  
Since the early 1980s, we have seen a rise of equity-based compensation for U.S. CEOs (Hall 
and Liebman, 1998) and an increase in shareholdings by large institutional investors (Gompers 
and Metrick, 2001).  Ample recent studies have addressed the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Issues being addressed include board size, board 
independence, board and ownership structure, CEO compensation and incentives, and CEO 
turnover, to name a few. The findings for these issues is mixed to a certain degree (Lehn and 
Zhao, 2006; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Goyal and Park, 2002; Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997; Rose and Shepard, 1997; 
Yermack, 1996; Jensen, 1993; Weisbach, 1988; and Demsetz and Lehn, 1985. We can only 
name a few since the reference on this topic is too long). The metric of internal efficiency used in 
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our analysis is able to simultaneously incorporate and control for effective governance and 
incentives, since the internal capital allocation efficiency is the consequence of balance between 
these effects. Therefore our research complements extant studies on the impact of governance 
and managerial incentives on efficiency and success of acquisitions.  
 
 
III. Development of Hypotheses 
 
 
3.1   What Should We Expect About The Announcement Period Performance For    
ICM Efficient (Inefficient) Firms? 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) investigate whether bad acquisitions are driven by 
managerial objectives, i.e. bidder firms with ―bad managers‖ systematically overpay in 
acquisitions in pursuit of personal objectives other than maximizing shareholders‘ value.  They 
employ two measures of past performance of the bidding firms to distinguish firms with good 
managers from those with bad managers: one is based on stock returns with dividends, and the 
other one is based on growth of income. The conclusion of their study is that firms with good 
managers (identified by good firm performance relative to its industry) experience higher 
announcement period performance in acquisitions than firms with bad managers, and the 
negative return to acquirers with bad managers shows a ―manifestation of agency problems in the 
firm.‖ 
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This paper attempts to test the ―management efficiency‖ hypothesis using a more refined 
measure, internal capital allocation efficiency, for pre-acquisition firm performance. To achieve 
efficient internal capital allocation, a firm has to find an efficient balance between sufficient 
monitoring and sufficient incentivizing of managers. Therefore our measure of internal 
investment efficiency is able to simultaneously incorporate and control for effective governance 
and sufficient incentives in our analysis. This measure is better able to tell how the firm is 
performing internally without having to compare it to other firms that may have different firm 
characteristics relative to the sample firm.  Our sample consists of all conglomerate acquirers 
that make acquisition announcements between 1986 and 2003 (only completed deals are 
included). We assume that efficient firms will have efficient internal capital allocations, and 
firms that suffer from the most severe agency problems will involve in a lot of inefficient cross-
subsidizations which results in inefficient internal capital allocations. Hence, we expect ICM 
efficient firms to make acquisitions that will increase firm value by exploring synergistic gains 
and/or taking advantage of an enlarged internal capital markets. On the other hand, since ICM 
inefficient firms suffer from the most severe agency problems, they are expected to derive 
private benefits from their acquisition transactions that are detrimental to firms‘ value. 
Consequently, the market will react positively (negatively) to the announcement of acquisitions 
by ICM efficient (inefficient) firms. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: ICM efficient (inefficient) 
firms are expected to experience positive (negative) announcement period performance. 
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3.2      What Should We Expect About The Long-Term Post-Acquisition Performance For    
           ICM Efficient (Inefficient) Firms? 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find long-term underperformance of acquiring firms in mergers 
which is predominantly caused by the poor post-acquisition performance of low book-to-market 
‗glamour‘ acquirers.  They regard it as strong evidence supporting the performance extrapolation 
hypothesis, which asserts that managers of ‗glamour‘ firms are more likely to be infected by 
hubris (Roll, 1986). Rau and Vermaelen (1998) sort all acquirers in the sample into equal 
subsamples of ‗glamour‘, ‗neutral‘, and ‗value‘ firms based on book-to-market ratio, with 
previous fiscal year book value taken from COMPUSTAT and the end of the announcement 
month market value taken from CRSP.  
 
We argue that internal investment efficient firms make efficient acquisitions, thus efficient firms 
receive positive announcement period abnormal returns. Moreover, if internal efficiency fully 
predicts external acquisition success and the market is efficient in incorporating this information 
in the stock prices at the announcement of acquisitions, we shall expect the long-run abnormal 
returns to be insignificantly different from zero. Conversely, suppose the market is behaving 
rationally, and the managers are infected by hubris. Thus the hubris hypothesis predicts efficient 
bidders to have lower announcement period abnormal returns than the inefficient bidders since 
efficient bidders are more likely to suffer from hubris that they are inclined to overpay. Whereas 
if market is efficient in absorbing all the information with regards to the acquisition at or around 
the acquisition announcement, we shall still observe insignificant long-term abnormal returns for 
acquirers. However the market might have over- or under-reacted to the announcements or 
additional new information may be released to the market gradually so that significant long-run 
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abnormal returns maybe observed. In this case, we need to calculate the total value effect of both 
the announcement and the post-acquisition period to distinguish between the above two 
hypotheses. Since the hubris hypothesis implies a value loss from acquisitions, while the 
managerial efficiency hypothesis predicts a total value gain (loss) for ICM efficient (inefficient) 
firms. Therefore a complete test of the hubris hypothesis vs. the managerial efficiency hypothesis 
have to incorporate the results from both the short-run and the long-run studies, and this will also 
shed light on market efficiency. In summary, our second hypothesis is: ICM efficient firms are 
expected to earn non-significant post-acquisition long-run abnormal returns. 
 
3.3   How Do The Pre-Announcement Excess Values Differ For ICM Efficient And Inefficient   
Firms?  How Should Their Excess Values Change Following Acquisitions?  
A diversification discount has been well documented in the literature, which leads to the 
conclusion of diversification being detrimental to firm value. (Refer to section two for a 
complete review on diversification‘s effect on firm value.) However, given the fact that 
numerous firms, especially a significant number of most prominent firms, do diversity and stay 
so, it is still an open question as to whether there is indeed a diversification discount, and 
whether the discount, if any, is indeed caused by diversification.  
 
Two competing theories argue for and against the benefit of diversification respectively. 
Diversification adds to firm value since firms can realize synergistic gains from operating a 
diversified company. Alternatively, managers choose to diversify in order to reap personal gains 
from the transaction, such as to diversify their personal risk, or to entrench themselves. However, 
in a well-managed and monitored firm, agency problems will be minimized, and conglomerate 
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firms will have more room to realize the gains brought about by forming an internal capital 
market. Therefore, our third hypothesis is: ICM efficient (inefficient) firms are expected to have 
higher (lower) excess values prior to acquisitions, and see an increase (decrease) in their excess 
values following acquisitions.    
 
There maybe also possibility that the efficient firms do not have higher excess value prior to the 
acquisition if the pre-acquisition year internal capital allocation efficiency is not the only factor 
affecting this excess value; however, the excess value improves for the efficient firms following 
acquisitions.  Even in this scenario, it is not opposing to our main argument that internally 
efficient firms also make efficient external investment decisions.  
 
3.4  How Do The ICM Efficient and Inefficient Firms Differ in Their Pre-Announcement  
 Operating Performances? How Should Their Operating Performances Change Following  
 Acquisitions?  
As a counterpart to the excess value analysis, we use the operating performance measures to 
conduct the same set of analyses to see how results will comply or differ. Therefore, our fourth 
hypothesis is: ICM efficient (inefficient) firms are expected to have higher (lower) operating 
performances prior to acquisitions, and the increase (decrease) in their operating performance 
following acquisitions are due to their internal capital allocation efficiency.    
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IV: Data and Construction of Variables 
 
 
4.1  Data 
Our sample consists of all conglomerate acquirers that announce and complete acquisition 
transactions between 1986 and 2003. Sample firms are obtained from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) Domestic Mergers database, based on the following criteria: (1) transaction 
being classified either as an acquisition, a merger, or an acquisition of majority interest; (2) the 
announcement date of the acquisition lies between January 1, 1986 and December 31, 2003; (3) 
the transaction is completed; (4) both acquirers and targets are publicly owned. We require 
acquirers to have at least two business segments with total consolidated firm sales of no less than 
$20 million, to be on both CRSP and COMPUSTAT, and not be in financial (SIC codes between 
6000 and 6999) and/or regulated industry (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) or have segments 
in the financial and/or regulated industry. Segment information is drawn from the COMPUSTAT 
Business Segment Information database. We exclude the transaction if the target is in the finance 
and/or regulated industry.  
 
Berger and Ofek (1995) point out that the inconsistency in reporting by multi-segment firms not 
fully allocating accounting items to the reported segments may result in potential distortion in 
analysis results involving business segment data. Therefore, following the convention of Berger 
and Ofek (1995) and Billett and Mauer (2003), we require that the sum of segment sales be 
within 1% of consolidated firm totals. Our sample consists of 384 multi-segment acquirers 
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(having two or more segments), with 1179 segment-year observations, that announce 
acquisitions between year 1986 and 2003 (only completed deals are included). The average 
number of segments per firm is approximately 3.07.  
 
4.2  Variables 
4.2.1 Measure of internal capital allocation efficiency  
We compute the value of a firm‘s internal capital allocation from the internal subsidies and 
transfers that it makes among different segments within the firm. If a segment spends more on 
capital expenditures than the after-tax cash flow it generates, it has to receive subsidies to cover 
the shortage in fund. Supposing the segment is performing better than its sibling segments within 
the same firm, this subsidy will be regarded as efficient. Whereas if a firm choose to subsidize a 
segment that is performing poorer compared to the other segments, then this constitutes an 
inefficient allocation of investment. The same logic holds true for the transfer scenario. If a 
segment is transferring funds away from a better performing segment, this is inefficient 
allocation of investment. Therefore based on the difference between a segment‘s capital 
expenditure and after-tax cash flow, we can find out whether this segment is receiving subsidy or 
eligible for potential transfer. Then using an efficiency measure to compare this segment‘s 
performance relative to its siblings within the same firm, we will be able to identify the value of 
this efficient (inefficient) subsidy or transfer. When this procedure is repeated for each segment 
within the firm, we can sum up these values to reach at an overall internal capital allocation 
efficiency measure for the firm.  
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Specifically, we define the subsidy and transfer variables in the same way as in Billett and Mauer 
(2003). First, the subsidy that segment i of sample firm j receives is defined as 
Subsidyi = Max(CAPEXi – ATCFi, 0)  
and  ATCFi = (EBITi – Ii)(1 - Ti) + Di 
where: CAPEXi = the segment‘s reported capital expenditures 
ATCFi  = the segment‘s after-tax cash flow 
 EBITi  = segment i‘s reported earnings before interest and taxes 
Ii = segment i‘s imputed interest expense 
Ti = segment i‘s imputed tax rate  
Di = segment i‘s reported depreciation expense.  
The imputed interest expense, Ii, is calculated as multiplying segment i‘s reported sales by the 
median single segment firm interest expense to sales ratio in segment i‘s industry. The imputed 
tax rate is measured by the median single segment firm taxes paid to pre-tax income ratio in 
segment i‘s industry. The segment‘s industry has to include a minimum of five single segment 
firms with available data on COMPUSTAT tapes, starting from the narrowest (four digit) SIC 
grouping. Subsidyi > 0 means that if segment i were a stand-alone firm, it would have to obtain 
external financing or reduce existing assets to maintain the same capital expenditures.  
 
If Subsidyi = 0, then ATCFi ≥ CAPEXi. We define the potential transfer of resources for segment 
i as follows: 
 PTransferi = Max(ATCFi – wiDIVj – CAPEXi, 0) 
23 
 
Where wi represent the asset weight of the transferring segment i, which is computed as the ratio 
of the asset of segment i to the total asset of all the transfer segments within the same firm. DIVj 
denotes the total cash dividend paid by firm j. Hence, we can compute segment i‘s transfer as: 
 Transferi = Min[ ),Subsidy(
PTransfer
PTransfer
1
i
1
i
i 
 

n
i
n
i
PTransferi] 
This modification ensures that the total amount of transfers will not exceed the total amount of 
subsidies; however, it does imply that the total subsidies can be greater than the total transfers. 
This will be the case if the firm finances external capital and allocates to a segment.  
 
Following Billett and Mauer (2003), we use the segment‘s sibling-adjusted return on assets 
( ROAROAi  ) as our measure of relative efficiency for segment subsidies and transfers. iROA  
is computed as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets for 
segment i, and ROA  equals to the corresponding asset-weighted average ROA of the firm‘s 
remaining segments. 
(i) If ROAROA i  ( ROAROA i  ), a subsidy is classified as efficient (inefficient). The 
subsidy will contribute ( ROAROAi  )(Subsidyi) > 0 (< 0) to a firm‘s internal capital allocation 
value.  
(ii) If ROAROA i  ( ROAROA i  ), a transfer is classified as efficient (inefficient).  The 
transfer will contribute ( iROA-ROA )(Transferi) > 0 (< 0) to a firm‘s internal capital allocation 
value.  
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The following indicator variables are defined for each segment i: 
Positivei = 1, if ROAROA i  ; and Positivei = 0, if ROAROA i  . 
Therefore for an n-segment diversified firm, the internal capital allocation measure in a given 
sample year is computed in the following steps: 
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where ES (IS) refers to efficient (inefficient) subsidy, ETS (ITS) refers to efficient (inefficient) 
transfer, and TA refers to the total asset of all the segments. Hence, for a given sample year, we 
compute the overall internal capital allocation (ICM) value of a diversified firm in two different 
ways:  
(1) The first measure is to use the net subsidy within a firm as a measure of internal capital 
allocation. Therefore 
 ICMS = ES– IS  
If a firm‘s ICMS (internal capital allocation based on net subsidy) value is positive, it implies 
that this firm is making more efficient subsidies than inefficient ones, if any. Thus, we classify 
firms with positive (negative) ICMS values as ICMS efficient (inefficient) firms. While firms 
with zero ICMS values are classified as ICMS inactive firms.  
(2) The second measure is to use the net effect of all subsidies and transfers made within a 
firm as a measure of internal capital allocation. Therefore 
 ICM = ES– IS + ETS – ITS 
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If a firm‘s ICM (internal capital allocation based on sum of subsidy and transfer) value is 
positive, it implies that this firm is making more efficient subsidies and transfers than inefficient 
ones, if any. Thus, we classify firms with positive (negative) ICM values as ICM efficient 
(inefficient) firms; and firms with zero ICM values are classified as ICM inactive firms.  
 
Our sample shows that there are 384 multi-segment acquirers that announce a merger or 
acquisition between years 1986 and 2003 and complete the deal eventually. The sample consists 
of 1179 segment-year observations which indicate that on average each acquirer has 3.07 
segments. Using the net subsidy received within a firm as a measure of internal capital 
allocation, there are 25 (6.51%) firms having ICM measures greater than zero, and 136 (35.42%) 
firms having negative ICM measures. There are 223 (58.07%) firms having zero ICM measures, 
which translate to no subsidy made within the internal capital allocation. 
2
 
 
4.2.2 Measures of excess value 
As in Berger and Ofek (1995), we calculate the excess value of diversified firms as the natural 
log of the ratio of a firm‘s actual value to its imputed value. Imputed value of each segment is 
calculated by multiplying the segment‘s assets (or sales) by the median ratio of total capital to 
the corresponding accounting items for single-segment firms in the same industry. By definition, 
the sum of the imputed values from all the segments gives us an indication of the firm value if all 
the segments are operated as single-segment firms. Total capital is measured as market value of 
common equity plus book value of debt. The segment‘s industry has to include a minimum of 
five single segment firms with sales no less than $20 million and available data to compute the 
                                                 
2
 When the internal capital market measure is computed as the sum of subsidies and transfers within a firm (ICM), 
we obtain the same summary statistics for this part.  
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ratios, starting from the narrowest (four digit) SIC grouping. Also following Berger and Ofek 
(1995), for the asset multiple, we require the sum of the segment assets be within 25% of the 
firm‘s total asset. Only observations meeting this criterion are kept in analyses using asset 
multiples. To account for the deviations between the sum of segment assets and total firm asset, 
the imputed value is adjusted up or down by the same percentage in deviation. We also exclude 
extreme excess values from the analysis, which is defined as the natural log of the ratio of a 
firm‘s actual value to imputed value being above 1.386 or below -1.386. 
 
4.2.3 Measures of Operating Performance 
We use two measures to evaluate firm‘s operating performance. The first one is the ratio of 
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets (EBITD/AT), which is also known 
as profitability.  And the second one is the ratio of sales to total assets (SALE/AT).   
 
4.2.4 Control Variables 
We include various control variables in different regressions. Below is a list of all the control 
variables that are to be employed in the following analyses: size, book-to-market ratio, method of 
payment, the nature of the acquisition (diversified vs. non-diversified), leverage, liquidity, and 
profitability.  
 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is defined as the 
ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. We obtain the book value of equity for 
the previous fiscal year from COMPUSTAT (annual data item number 60), and compute the 
market value of equity as the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
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outstanding at the fiscal year end of the pre-announcement year. We distinguish between 
acquisitions that are financed by 100% cash, or by stock or a combination of both stock and cash. 
A diversifying acquisition is defined as one where target does not share same four-digit SIC code 
with the acquirer in their top three industries of operations; otherwise, it is regarded as a non-
diversifying acquisition. Leverage is measured by dividing book value of debt by total assets. 
Liquidity is defined as the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets. And 
profitability is calculated as the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, 
and depreciation to total assets.  
 
Table 1a shows the descriptive statistics of firm-year observations of the multi-segment acquirers 
when internal capital allocation is based on net subsidy; and Table 1b shows the descriptive 
statistics when internal capital allocation is based on sum of subsidy and transfer. For each 
variable within each table, the descriptive statistics for ICM(S) inefficient firms, inactive firms, 
efficient firms, and the whole sample are shown. For the excess value measures and the 
operating performance measures, data in the three years after the announcement year (year (+3)) 
are drawn as well (for example, if the acquisition is announced in year 1986, three years after the 
announcement year refers to year 1989); and we also include the change in these values from 
year (-1) (the pre-announcement year) to year (+3) in these descriptive statistics tables. All the 
rest of the variables are based on the fiscal year end data in the pre-announcement year.  
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Table 1a: 
       
        Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Year Observations of Multi-Segment Acquirers 
 (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy) 
    
        Efficiency indicates whether it belongs to the ICMS efficient firms (Efficiency = 1), or ICMS 
inefficient firms (Efficiency = -1), or ICMS inactive firms (Efficiency = 0), or it includes all sample 
firms (Efficiency = All). Year (+3) refers to three years after the acquisition announcement year. 
Year (-1) refers to the pre-announcement year. If year information is not specified, it refers to the 
pre-announcement year fiscal year end data. Total Asset and Sales are in millions. Excess value (EV) 
is computed as the natural log of the ratio of a firm‘s actual value to its imputed value. Imputed value 
of each segment is calculated by multiplying the segment‘s assets (or sales) by the median ratio of 
total capital to the corresponding accounting items for single-segment firms in the same industry. 
Total capital is measured as market value of common equity plus book value of debt. Market value 
of common equity is the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.  
Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus 
marketable securities to total assets. Profitability (also as EBITD/TA) is the ratio of total 
consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets. SALE/AT is the 
ratio of firm sales to total assets. DCash is the dummy variable for cash financing. DCash = 1 if the 
acquisition is 100 percent cash financed. DCash = 0 otherwise. Drelated is the dummy variable for 
relatedness of the acquirer and the target. DRelated = 1 if the acquirer and the target share a four-
digit SIC industry in any of their top three industries of operations. DRelated = 0 otherwise.  
Variable Efficiency Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
        Value of Internal -1 -0.0113 -0.0015 0.0386 -0.3642 -0.00002 138 
Capital Market 0 0 0 0 0 0 223 
(Based on Net  1 0.0385 0.0014 0.1506 0.00001 0.7565 25 
Subsidy) All -0.0015 0 0.0457 -0.3642 0.7565 384 
        Total Asset -1 4383.59 1061.55 9620.93 14.12 81548.87 136 
 
0 4589.34 2467.2 6286.21 19.03 40556 223 
 
1 4751.85 1437.42 6813.45 60.94 25322 25 
 
All 4527.05 1619.53 7645.48 14.12 81548.87 384 
        Sales -1 3827.46 1033.68 6822.54 21.75 42473.25 136 
 
0 4986.52 2172.75 7328.39 23.48 47947.6 223 
 
1 4814.38 1711 6458.3 40.27 18684 25 
 
All 4564.81 1906.82 7102.86 21.75 47947.6 384 
        EV Based on -1 0.0466 0.0289 0.3495 -0.6783 1.1876 105 
Asset Multiples 0 0.1823 0.1988 0.3486 -0.6342 1.0383 168 
 
1 0.0259 -0.0141 0.3438 -0.6471 0.8491 20 
 
All 0.123 0.1115 0.3542 -0.6783 1.1876 293 
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(Table continued.) 
 
       EV Based on -1 0.0692 -0.0156 0.5036 -0.9043 1.3108 129 
Sales Multiples 0 0.1879 0.1543 0.4644 -1.649 1.934 217 
 
1 -0.1076 -0.2132 0.4904 -1.0138 0.9706 25 
 
All 0.1267 0.0922 0.4861 -1.649 1.934 371 
        EV Based on -1 -0.0063 -0.059 0.3629 -0.606 1.3711 60 
Asset Multiples 0 0.1197 0.0828 0.4651 -0.8798 1.2865 104 
in Year (+3) 1 0.2297 0.3093 0.3671 -0.3892 1.0003 11 
 
All 0.0834 -0.0042 0.4305 -0.8798 1.3711 175 
        EV Based on  -1 0.0112 -0.0027 0.4265 -1.3381 1.3785 72 
Sales Multiples 0 0.1398 0.1697 0.5355 -1.2358 1.5147 125 
in Year (+3) 1 0.0422 0.232 0.6291 -1.3806 0.6534 15 
 
All 0.0892 0.078 0.5097 -1.3806 1.5147 212 
        Change in EV Based  -1 -0.0424 -0.0785 0.3351 -0.9927 1.0266 55 
on Asset Multiples 0 -0.0584 -0.0145 0.392 -1.2287 0.7337 84 
(=Value in Year(+3)  1 0.0264 0.1827 0.4 -0.5232 0.583 8 
 - Value in Year(-1)) All -0.0478 -0.0373 0.37 -1.2287 1.0266 147 
        Change in EV Based  -1 -0.0415 0.0294 0.4228 -1.5092 1.1435 67 
on Sales Multiples 0 -0.0206 -0.0193 0.4701 -1.1944 1.1651 123 
(=Value in Year(+3)  1 0.2672 0.2937 0.7124 -1.1454 1.6672 15 
 - Value in Year(-1)) All -0.0064 0.0155 0.4805 -1.5092 1.6672 205 
        Book-to-Market Ratio -1 0.5322 0.482 0.3822 -0.5447 2.3582 130 
 
0 0.4001 0.3672 0.2603 -0.7201 1.7002 221 
 
1 0.4948 0.4739 0.2547 0.0203 1.0407 25 
 
All 0.452 0.4115 0.3132 -0.7201 2.3582 376 
        Leverage -1 0.5607 0.5699 0.1893 0.1062 1.2652 136 
 
0 0.563 0.5521 0.1605 0.1357 1.6058 223 
 
1 0.5949 0.5953 0.1732 0.1893 0.9842 25 
 
All 0.5642 0.5672 0.1718 0.1062 1.6058 384 
        Liquidity -1 0.1002 0.0594 0.1173 0.0009 0.6031 136 
 
0 0.0856 0.0487 0.0974 0 0.5911 223 
 
1 0.0805 0.0376 0.1013 0.0014 0.3769 25 
 
All 0.0904 0.0518 0.1051 0 0.6031 384 
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(Table Continued.) 
 
       Profitability  -1 0.1263 0.1362 0.0705 -0.159 0.2632 136 
(EBITD/AT) 0 0.1737 0.1691 0.0641 0.0099 0.3517 223 
 
1 0.1483 0.1389 0.0708 0.0141 0.3328 25 
 
All 0.1553 0.1569 0.0703 -0.159 0.3517 384 
        SALE/AT -1 1.1119 1.005 0.6552 0.1497 5.5946 136 
 
0 1.1671 1.0726 0.5613 0.1083 3.659 223 
 
1 1.1637 1.062 0.8826 0.2528 4.6954 25 
 
All 1.1474 1.0579 0.6192 0.1083 5.5946 384 
        EBITD/AT -1 0.0247 0.1089 0.8244 -7.8496 0.2867 94 
in Year (+3) 0 0.14 0.1396 0.066 -0.1528 0.2876 169 
 
1 0.1405 0.1411 0.0652 -0.037 0.2646 18 
 
All 0.1015 0.1341 0.4812 -7.8496 0.2876 281 
        SALE/AT -1 0.9926 0.9317 0.6418 0 4.7809 95 
in Year (+3) 0 1.0251 0.9678 0.4678 0.1068 3.5117 169 
 
1 1.1827 0.7813 0.9383 0.3008 3.8517 18 
 
All 1.0242 0.9537 0.5691 0 4.7809 282 
        Change in EBITD/AT -1 -0.1116 -0.0204 0.8303 -8.0456 0.208 94 
(= Value in Year(+3) 0 -0.0365 -0.0233 0.069 -0.396 0.0823 169 
 - Value in Year(-1)) 1 -0.0044 -0.0221 0.0741 -0.1354 0.1201 18 
 
All -0.0596 -0.0213 0.4833 -8.0456 0.208 281 
        Change in SALE/AT -1 -0.1851 -0.1491 0.3811 -1.0384 1.1597 95 
(= Value in Year(+3) 0 -0.173 -0.1444 0.3187 -1.5555 0.7526 169 
 - Value in Year(-1)) 1 -0.0623 -0.1783 0.8998 -2.1835 2.6154 18 
 
All -0.17 -0.147 0.3989 -2.1835 2.6154 282 
        Dcash -1 0.4 0 0.493 0 1 136 
 
0 0.39 0 0.489 0 1 223 
 
1 0.16 0 0.374 0 1 25 
 
All 0.38 0 0.486 0 1 384 
        Drelated -1 0.41 0 0.494 0 1 136 
 
0 0.39 0 0.488 0 1 223 
 
1 0.48 0 0.51 0 1 25 
 
All 0.4 0 0.491 0 1 384 
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Table 1b: 
       
        Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Year Observations of Multi-Segment Acquirers 
 (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of Subsidy and Transfer) 
  
        Efficiency indicates whether it belongs to the ICM efficient firms (Efficiency = 1), or ICM inefficient 
firms (Efficiency = -1), or ICM inactive firms (Efficiency =0), or it includes all sample firms (Efficiency 
= All). Year (+3) refers to three years after the acquisition announcement year. Year (-1) refers to the pre-
announcemet year. If year information is not specified, it refers to the pre-announcement year fiscal year 
end data. Total Asset and Sales are in millions. Excess value (EV) is computed as the natural log of the 
ratio of a firm‘s actual value to its imputed value. Imputed value of each segment is calculated by 
multiplying the segment‘s assets (or sales) by the median ratio of total capital to the corresponding 
accounting items for single-segment firms in the same industry. Total capital is measured as market value 
of common equity plus book value of debt. Market value of common equity is the product of the share 
price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total 
assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability (also as 
EBITD/TA) is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total 
assets. SALE/AT is the ratio of firm sales to total assets. DCash is the dummy variable for cash financing. 
DCash = 1 if the acquisition is 100 percent cash financed. DCash = 0 otherwise. Drelated is the dummy 
variable for relatedness of the acquirer and the target. DRelated = 1 if the acquirer and the target share a 
four-digit SIC industry in any of their top three industries of operations. DRelated = 0 otherwise.  
Variable Efficiency Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
        Value of Internal -1 -0.0172 -0.0023 0.0598 -0.5475 -0.000009 136 
Capital Market 0 0 0 0 0 0 223 
(Based on Sum of  1 0.0386 0.0017 0.1506 0.00001 0.7565 25 
Subsidy & Transfer) All -0.0036 0 0.0536 -0.5475 0.7565 384 
        Total Asset -1 4399.42 1066.5 9616.99 14.12 81548.87 136 
 
0 4589.34 2467.2 6286.21 19.03 40556 223 
 
1 4665.71 1405.3 6848.78 60.94 25322 25 
 
All 4527.05 1619.53 7645.48 14.12 81548.87 384 
        Sales -1 3836.16 1082.31 6819.05 21.75 42473.25 136 
 
0 4986.52 2172.75 7328.39 23.48 47947.6 223 
 
1 4767.06 1200.49 6486.26 40.27 18684 25 
 
All 4564.81 1906.82 7102.86 21.75 47947.6 384 
        EV Based on -1 0.0375 0.0128 0.3384 -0.6783 1.1876 105 
Asset Multiples 0 0.1823 0.1988 0.3486 -0.6342 1.0383 168 
 
1 0.0741 0.004 0.3987 -0.6471 0.9339 20 
 
All 0.123 0.1115 0.3542 -0.6783 1.1876 293 
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(Table Continued.) 
 
EV Based on -1 0.0609 -0.0189 0.5003 -0.9043 1.3108 129 
Sales Multiples 0 0.1879 0.1543 0.4644 -1.649 1.934 217 
 
1 -0.0646 -0.1771 0.5212 -1.0138 0.9706 25 
 
All 0.1267 0.0922 0.4861 -1.649 1.934 371 
        EV Based on -1 -0.0063 -0.059 0.3629 -0.606 1.3711 60 
Asset Multiples 0 0.1197 0.0828 0.4651 -0.8798 1.2865 104 
in Year (+3) 1 0.2297 0.3093 0.3671 -0.3892 1.0004 11 
 
All 0.0834 -0.0042 0.4305 -0.8798 1.3711 175 
        EV Based on  -1 0.0112 -0.0027 0.4265 -1.3381 1.3785 72 
Sales Multiples 0 0.1398 0.1697 0.5355 -1.2358 1.5147 125 
in Year (+3) 1 0.0422 0.232 0.6291 -1.3806 0.6534 15 
 
All 0.0892 0.078 0.5097 -1.3806 1.5147 212 
        Change in EV Based  -1 -0.0424 -0.0785 0.3351 -0.9927 1.0266 55 
on Asset Multiples 0 -0.0584 -0.0145 0.392 -1.2287 0.7337 84 
(=Value in Year(+3)  1 0.0264 0.1827 0.4 -0.5232 0.583 8 
 - Value in Year(-1)) All -0.0478 -0.0373 0.37 -1.2287 1.0266 147 
        Change in EV Based  -1 -0.0415 0.0294 0.4228 -1.5092 1.1435 67 
on Sales Multiples 0 -0.0206 -0.0193 0.4701 -1.1944 1.1651 123 
(=Value in Year(+3)  1 0.2672 0.2937 0.7124 -1.1454 1.6672 15 
 - Value in Year(-1)) All -0.0064 0.0155 0.4805 -1.5092 1.6672 205 
        Book-to-Market  -1 0.5335 0.482 0.3818 -0.5447 2.3582 130 
Ratio 0 0.4001 0.3672 0.2603 -0.7201 1.7002 221 
 
1 0.4879 0.4232 0.2575 0.0203 1.0407 25 
 
All 0.452 0.4115 0.3132 -0.7201 2.3582 376 
        Leverage -1 0.563 0.5699 0.187 0.1062 1.2652 136 
 
0 0.563 0.5521 0.1605 0.1357 1.6058 223 
 
1 0.5822 0.5953 0.1887 0.1893 0.9842 25 
 
All 0.5642 0.5672 0.1718 0.1062 1.6058 384 
        Liquidity -1 0.1 0.0593 0.1173 0.0009 0.6031 136 
 
0 0.0856 0.0487 0.0974 0 0.5911 223 
 
1 0.0817 0.0376 0.1012 0.0014 0.3769 25 
 
All 0.0904 0.0518 0.1051 0 0.6031 384 
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Profitability  -1 0.1268 0.1382 0.0706 -0.159 0.2632 136 
(EBITD/AT) 0 0.1737 0.1691 0.0641 0.0099 0.3517 223 
 
1 0.1457 0.1363 0.0711 0.0141 0.3328 25 
 
All 0.1553 0.1569 0.0703 -0.159 0.3517 384 
        SALE/AT -1 1.1119 1.005 0.6553 0.1497 5.5946 136 
 
0 1.1671 1.0726 0.5613 0.1083 3.659 223 
 
1 1.164 1.062 0.8824 0.2528 4.6954 25 
 
All 1.1474 1.0579 0.6192 0.1083 5.5946 384 
        EBITD/AT -1 0.026 0.109 0.8201 -7.8496 0.2867 95 
in Year (+3) 0 0.14 0.1396 0.066 -0.1528 0.2876 169 
 
1 0.1404 0.1402 0.0672 -0.037 0.2646 17 
 
All 0.1015 0.1341 0.4812 -7.8496 0.2876 281 
        SALE/AT -1 0.9857 0.9187 0.642 0 4.7809 96 
in Year (+3) 0 1.0251 0.9678 0.4678 0.1068 3.5117 169 
 
1 1.2327 0.8252 0.9421 0.3008 3.8517 17 
 
All 1.0242 0.9537 0.5691 0 4.7809 282 
        Change in  -1 -0.1107 -0.0208 0.8259 -8.0456 0.208 95 
EBITD/AT 0 -0.0365 -0.0233 0.069 -0.396 0.0823 169 
 (= Value in Year(+3) 1 -0.0029 -0.0213 0.0762 -0.1354 0.1201 17 
- Value in Year(-1)) All -0.0596 -0.0213 0.4833 -8.0456 0.208 281 
        Change in SALE/AT -1 -0.1855 -0.1496 0.3791 -1.0384 1.1597 96 
(= Value in Year(+3) 0 -0.173 -0.1444 0.3187 -1.5555 0.7526 169 
 - Value in Year(-1)) 1 -0.053 -0.1685 0.9266 -2.1835 2.6154 17 
 
All -0.17 -0.147 0.3989 -2.1835 2.6154 282 
        Dcash -1 0.4 0 0.493 0 1 136 
 
0 0.39 0 0.489 0 1 223 
 
1 0.16 0 0.374 0 1 25 
 
All 0.38 0 0.486 0 1 384 
        Drelated -1 0.41 0 0.494 0 1 136 
 
0 0.39 0 0.488 0 1 223 
 
1 0.48 0 0.51 0 1 25 
 
All 0.4 0 0.491 0 1 384 
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V.Methodology and Results 
 
 
5.1       Announcement Period Performance of the Acquiring Firms 
We apply the standard event study method with the market model to estimate the announcement 
period cumulative abnormal returns. The market model is:  
 jtmtjjjt RR    
where Rmt denotes the return on a market portfolio for date t. j represents the mean return not 
explained by the market, and j measures the market risk for firm j over the period.  Parameter 
estimations, denoted by jˆ  and jˆ , are obtained by running a regression for the days in a clean 
period, which is chosen as a 255-day period ending 46 days prior to the first announcement date 
of acquisitions. Predicted returns for announcement period
3
 are computed using the estimated 
parameters: 
 mtjjjt RR 
ˆˆˆ   
where Rmt represents the market return of the then current period. The abnormal return is 
computed as the difference of the actual return on the event date minus the predicted return:  
 jtjtjt RRr
ˆ  
The average residual for date t in event time is measured by the average of the abnormal returns 
across all the sample firms. Let N denotes the number of sample firms, then: 
 
N
r
AR
j
jt
t

  
                                                 
3
 Selected intervals are: (-30, -2), (-1, 0), (0, +1), (2, +30), (-3, +3), (-30, +30). 
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When we sum up the ARs for each day over the event period, we obtain the measure of the 
cumulative average residual (CAR). Taking the (-30, -2) interval as an example, the CAR is 
equal to: 
 



2
30t
tARCAR  
 
We expect the CAR for the ICM efficient (inefficient) firms to be significantly greater (less) than 
zero. 
 
Table 2a shows the results of event study on the sample firms when the internal capital allocation 
measure is based on net subsidy. Estimated by the market model, using the equally weighted 
index, we find that the mean cumulative abnormal return within event window (-3, +3) is -0.54% 
(significant at the 1% level) for the ICMS inefficient firms; -0.57% (significant at the 5% level) 
for the inactive firms; and 2.26% (significant at 5%) for the efficient firms. This is consistent 
with our predictions that the announcement period CAR for ICMS efficient (inefficient) firms is 
significantly greater (less) than zero. A second finding from Table 1a tells us that the ICMS 
inactive firms are receiving negative CAR throughout the various event windows that we select, 
both in the pre-announcement period and in the post-announcement period. However, firms with 
active internal capital allocations (including both ICMS inefficient and efficient firms) are 
receiving positive CARs in event window (0, +1). Although after that, for example in the event 
window (+2, +30) that we choose, the ICMS inefficient firms are observed to have a negative 
CAR of -0.88%, whereas the ICMS efficient firms are receiving a positive CAR of 2.43%. This 
interesting finding seems to reveal that the market is having certain expectations for firms with 
active internal capital allocations; however, the market cannot distinguish between the ICMS 
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efficient firms and inefficient firms when the merger announcement is made. While shortly after 
the announcement date, the market recognizes the difference, therefore, the ICMS inefficient 
firms are receiving a negative CAR in event window (+2, +30), compared to the positive CAR 
for the ICMS efficient firms.        
 
Table 2a: 
       
        Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return 
  (Internal Capital Allocation Based On Net Subsidy) 
   
        Market Model, Equally Weighted Index 
    
  
ICMS  
 
ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
  
Inefficient  Inactive  
 
Efficient 
    firms   firms   firms   
No. of Obs.   127   212   24   
Event Window: 
      (-30, -2) 
 
1.95% 
 
-1.08% c 0.93% 
 (-1,0)  
 
0.44% 
 
-0.56% aa -1.03% b 
(0,+1) 
 
0.22% b -0.24% b 0.74% 
 (+2,+30) 
 
-0.88% 
 
-0.58% 
 
2.43% 
 (-3,+3)  
 
-0.54% a -0.57% b 2.26% b 
(-30,+30)   1.63%   -1.94% c 4.03%   
        Market Model, Value Weighted Index 
    
  
ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
  
Inefficient  Inactive  
 
Efficient 
    firms   firms   firms   
No. of Obs.   127   212   24   
Event Window: 
      (-30, -2) 
 
2.26% 
 
-0.39% 
 
-0.09% 
 (-1,0)  
 
0.29% 
 
-0.52% aa -1.19% a 
(0,+1) 
 
0.13% a -0.29% b 0.47% 
 (+2,+30) 
 
-1.07% 
 
-1.35% c 1.04% 
 (-3,+3)  
 
-0.59% a -0.51% b 1.79% c 
(-30,+30)   1.62%   -2.01% b 1.42%   
 The symbols aa, a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels respectively, using a 1-tail test.  
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Table 2b shows the event study results when the internal capital allocation measure is based on 
sum of subsidy and transfer.  Results in this part exhibit the same pattern as in Table 1a, 
therefore we will not elaborate on the discussions.  
 
Table 2b: 
       
        Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return 
  (Internal Capital Allocation Based On Sum of Subsidy and Transfer) 
 
        Market Model, Equally Weighted Index 
    
  
ICM 
 
ICM 
 
ICM 
 
  
Inefficient  Inactive  
 
Efficient 
    firms   firms   firms   
No. of Obs.   127   212   24   
Event Window: 
      (-30, -2) 
 
2.30% c -1.08% c -0.91% 
 (-1,0)  
 
0.37% 
 
-0.56% aa -0.64% 
 (0,+1) 
 
0.15% a -0.24% b 1.09% b 
(+2,+30) 
 
-0.77% 
 
-0.58% 
 
1.80% 
 (-3,+3)  
 
-0.63% a -0.57% b 2.69% b 
(-30,+30)   2.04%   -1.94% c 1.85%   
        Market Model, Value Weighted Index 
    
  
ICM 
 
ICM 
 
ICM 
 
  
Inefficient  Inactive  
 
Efficient 
    firms   firms   firms   
No. of Obs.   127   212   24   
Event Window: 
      (-30, -2) 
 
2.49% 
 
-0.39% 
 
-1.29% 
 (-1,0)  
 
0.20% c -0.52% aa -0.71% 
 (0,+1) 
 
0.06% a -0.29% b 0.88% c 
(+2,+30) 
 
-0.97% 
 
-1.35% c 0.50% 
 (-3,+3)  
 
-0.68% aa -0.51% b 2.30% b 
(-30,+30)   1.87%   -2.01% b 0.05%   
        The symbols aa, a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels respectively, using a 1-tail test.  
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Since many studies document stronger performance following cash financed acquisitions than 
equity financed ones (Franks, Harris and Mayer, 1988; Gregory, 1997; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), we investigate the importance of method of payments in the 
success of acquisitions by measuring the performance of the two groups—100 percent cash 
financed, and other (including equity financed, and cash and equity financed) —within each of 
the three firm categories, namely the ICMS efficient firms, the ICMS inactive firms, and the 
ICMS inefficient firms. The same approaches will be employed to investigate whether non-
diversifying acquisitions are more likely to succeed in acquisitions than diversifying acquisitions.   
 
Table 3 shows the results of these sub group analysis. In this table, we choose the announcement 
period CAR of event window (-3, +3) for comparison; and the ICM measure is based on net 
subsidy. Within each ICMS group, we can see a difference in CAR between all cash financed 
mergers versus other mergers; and between related mergers versus unrelated mergers. Related 
mergers are those where the acquirer and the target share the same 4-digit SIC code in their top 
three business segments of operation. However, what is noticeably is that the between-group 
differences for cash and relatedness effects is much bigger than the within group differences. For 
example: for the ICMS inefficient firms, the CAR for acquirers using less than 100 percent cash 
is -0.26%, while it is -1.00% for acquirers using 100 percent cash; however for the ICMS 
efficient firms, these two values are 2.40% and 1.52% respectively. The within group difference 
is 0.74% for the ICMS inefficient firms, and 0.88% for the ICMS efficient firms. However, the 
between group difference (we subtract CAR of inefficient firms from that of efficient firms) is 
2.66% for acquirers using less than 100 percent cash financing, and 2.52% for acquirers using 
100 percent cash. Examinations of the relatedness effects demonstrate similar pattern.  
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Table 3: 
       
        Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return 
   (Internal Capital Allocation Based On Net Subsidy) 
     
        RELATEDNESS is determined by whether the acquirer and the target share a four-digit SIC 
industry in any of their top three industries of operations. 
        Market Model, Equally Weighted Index 
      
        
  
ICMS  
 
ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
  
Inefficient  
 
Inactive  
 
Efficient 
     firms   firms   firms   
Event Window: (-3, +3) 
 
-0.54% a -0.57% b 2.26% b 
N 
 
127 
 
212 
 
24 
                 
CASH 
       
        < 100 percent cash financed  
 
-0.26% b -1.14% a 2.40% c 
N 
 
78 
 
130 
 
20 
 
        100 percent cash financed  
 
-1.00% c 0.32% 
 
1.52% 
 N 
 
49 
 
82 
 
4 
                 
RELATEDNESS 
       
        Unrelated merger  
 
-0.11% 
 
-0.38% b 0.96 
 N 
 
75 
 
128 
 
13 
 
        Related merger 
 
-1.16% a -0.87% c 3.79 b 
N   52   84   11   
        The symbols aa, a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels  
respectively, using a 1-tail test.  
       
         
 
Table 3 also tells us that for the ICMS inactive firms, the announcement period CAR of all cash 
financed acquisitions (0.32%) is greater than that of acquisitions financed by some or all stock (-
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1.14%, significant at 1% level). This is consistent with the method of payment hypothesis which 
expects equity prices to drop following stock acquisitions. However, looking at the ICMS 
efficient firms, the evidence is totally reversed; with CAR of 1.52% for the all cash financed 
acquisitions and 2.40% (significant at 10% level) for the less than 100 percent cash financed 
acquisitions. And for the ICMS inefficient firms, the CARs are significantly negative for both all 
cash financed acquisitions (-1.00%, significant at 10% level) and otherwise financed acquisitions 
(-0.26%, significant at 5% level). As to the relatedness of the acquisitions, Table 3 shows that 
ICMS inefficient and inactive firms receive negative CARs no matter the acquisition is related or 
not; whereas, the CAR is positive for ICMS efficient firms for both related and unrelated 
acquisitions. Therefore we can infer that at lease for our sample of multi-segment acquirers, the 
effects of the internal capital allocation efficiency on announcement period CAR dominate those 
of method of payment and relatedness. 
 
A regression is run to further investigate the dominating effects of the internal capital allocation 
efficiency. The dependent variable is the acquirer‘s standardized CAR for event window (-3, +3), 
the independent variables include a dummy for ICM efficiency as well as ICM inefficiency, a 
dummy for all cash financing, and a dummy for relatedness of the merger. We also include size 
(defined as the natural log of firm‘s total asset), and book-to-market ratio (defined as the ratio of 
the firm‘s book value of equity over its market value of equity) at the end of the fiscal year prior 
to the announcement year as control variables. Table 4a shows the regression results when 
internal capital allocation is based on net subsidy only; and Table 4b presents the results when 
internal capital allocation is based on the sum of subsidy and transfer. Within each table, part (I) 
shows the regression results on all of the dummy variables as well as the control variables; (II) 
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shows the results when relatedness effect is ruled out; and (III) shows the results when method of 
payments effect is ruled out. We predict the coefficient on the efficient internal capital allocation 
dummy variable to be positive, and that on the inefficient internal capital allocation dummy to be 
negative. Results in Table 4a show that the signs of these coefficients are consistent with our 
predictions, although not significant. However, in Table 4b, the coefficient on the ICM 
efficiency component is significantly greater than zero for all three parts (I, II and III) of the 
regressions. While the coefficients on the cash and relatedness components are not significant. 
These results further reinforce the previous findings that the internal capital allocation efficiency 
is a significant contributor to the announcement period abnormal return.    
 
 
Table 4a:  
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Announcement Period CAR on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy) 
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's standardized CAR in event window (-3, +3).  Firm size 
is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding.   
      Acquirer's Standardized CAR    
   
Event window (-3, +3) 
  Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.311 
 
0.298 
 
0.315 
 
  
(0.778) 
 
(0.747) 
 
(0.789) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.488 
 
0.486 
 
0.458 
 Market Is Efficient (ICMS>0) (1.582) 
 
(1.579) 
 
(1.498) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.152 
 
-0.153 
 
-0.152 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-0.924) 
 
(-0.930) 
 
(-0.925) 
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       Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.13 
 
0.14 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.810) 
 
(0.883) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  -0.0746 
   
-0.0913 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-0.483) 
   
(-0.597) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) -0.0778 
 
-0.0797 c -0.0729 
 
  
(-1.646) 
 
(-1.696) 
 
(-1.557) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.255 
 
0.242 
 
0.293 
 
  
(1.010) 
 
(0.964) 
 
(1.184) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
358 
 
358 
 
358 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.026 
 
0.025 
 
0.024 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.009   0.011   0.01   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
      
 
 
Table 4b:  
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Announcement Period CAR on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of  
 Subsidy and Transfer) 
       
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's standardized CAR in event window (-3, +3).  Firm size 
is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding.   
      Acquirer's Standardized CAR    
   
Event window (-3, +3) 
  Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.305 
 
0.291 
 
0.31 
 
  
(0.765) 
 
(0.733) 
 
(0.778) 
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       Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.613 b 0.611 b 0.582 c 
Market Is Efficient (ICM>0) (1.996) 
 
(1.993) 
 
(1.910) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.177 
 
-0.178 
 
-0.177 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICM<0) (-1.078) 
 
(-1.084) 
 
(-1.079) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.137 
 
0.148 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.861) 
 
(0.936) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  -0.0756 
   
-0.0932 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-0.491) 
   
(-0.611) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) -0.0775 
 
-0.0795 c -0.0724 
 
  
(-1.647) 
 
(-1.697) 
 
(-1.552) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.26 
 
0.246 
 
0.3 
 
  
(1.032) 
 
(0.986) 
 
(1.215) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
358 
 
358 
 
358 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.032 
 
0.031 
 
0.03 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.015   0.017   0.016   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
      
 
Due to the nature of the size of our efficient ICM firms, we further classify sample firms into two 
groups and run the regressions again. We classify firms that have negative ICM(S) values as 
ICM(S) inefficient firms; and the rest of the firms as ICM(S) efficient firms. Table 4c shows the 
regression results when ICM is based on net subsidy; and Table 4d reports the results when ICM 
is based on sum of subsidy and transfer. In these regressions, we include one dummy for ICM(S) 
inefficient firms. The results again show the predicted sign on this dummy variable, although not 
statistically significant.  
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Table 4c:  
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Announcement Period CAR on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy) 
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's standardized CAR in event window (-3, +3).  Firm size 
is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding.   
              Acquirer's Standardized CAR    
   
Event window (-3, +3) 
  Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.365 
 
0.352 
 
0.366 
 
  
(0.914) 
 
(0.884) 
 
(0.917) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.206 
 
-0.206 
 
-0.203 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-1.274) 
 
(-1.279) 
 
(-1.260) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.09967 
 
0.11 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.626) 
 
(0.696) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  -0.0721 
   
-0.0853 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-0.466) 
   
(-0.557) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) -0.0789 c -0.0808 c -0.0751 
 
  
(-1.668) 
 
(-1.716) 
 
(-1.601) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.29 
 
0.277 
 
0.319 
 
  
(1.152) 
 
(1.109) 
 
(1.287) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
358 
 
358 
 
358 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.019 
 
0.018 
 
0.018 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.005   0.007   0.006   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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Table 4d:  
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Announcement Period CAR on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of  
 Subsidy and Transfer) 
       
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's standardized CAR in event window (-3, +3).  Firm size 
is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding.   
              Acquirer's Standardized CAR    
   
Event window (-3, 3) 
  Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.38 
 
0.367 
 
0.381 
 
  
(0.955) 
 
(0.925) 
 
(0.958) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.244 
 
-0.245 
 
-0.242 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICM<0) (-1.515) 
 
(-1.520) 
 
(-1.501) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.1 
 
0.11 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.631) 
 
(0.701) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  -0.072 
   
-0.0852 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-0.466) 
   
(-0.557) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) -0.0799 c -0.0818 
 
-0.076 
 
  
(-1.690) 
 
(-1.738) 
 
(-1.623) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.3 
 
0.288 
 
0.329 
 
  
(1.193) 
 
(1.150) 
 
(1.329) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
358 
 
358 
 
358 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.021 
 
0.02 
 
0.019 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.007   0.009   0.008   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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5.2       Measuring the Long-term Performance of the Acquirers 
Measurement for the long-term stock performance has long been in debate in the literature. 
Following Ritter (1991), mean buy-and-hold abnormal return ( RAHB ) has become a 
convention in measuring the long-run performance. However, Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
Barber, Lyon and Tsai (1999) point out that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated from 
comparing to a reference portfolio produce biased results due to the new listings, rebalancing of 
benchmark portfolios, and the skewness of multiyear abnormal returns. Remedies to these 
problems include utilizing more carefully constructed benchmark portfolios and skewness-
adjusted t-statistics with bootstrapping. The bootstrapping procedure assumes that the event-firm 
abnormal returns are independent. However, as Fama (1998) points out, methodologies that fail 
to account for the cross-sectional dependence arising from calendar-time clustering of events will 
produce biased results. The monthly calendar-time portfolio approach advocated by Fama (1998) 
corrects this problem since all the cross-correlations of event firm abnormal returns have already 
been accounted for in the variance of the portfolio. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) provide 
evidence that the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return methodology with inferences from a 
bootstrapping procedure which assumes cross-sectional independence produce test statistics that 
are ―up to four times too large.‖ They conclude that the calendar-time portfolio approach has 
more power in detecting abnormal long-run performance than the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
approach. In this study, we conduct long-run abnormal return analysis based on the calendar-
time portfolio approach.   
 
Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000), an EW portfolio is constructed each month to include 
all the event firms that have the transaction completed within the previous three years. The 
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portfolios are rebalanced each month to exclude firms that are out of the prior three-year event 
range and to include all new event firms that have just completed their acquisition transactions. 
The abnormal returns are then regressed on the Fama and French (1993) three factors:  
 tptptptftmpptftp eHMLhSMBsRRbaRR ,,,,, )(    
where p represent the combined effects of mispricing and model misspecification, if it exists, of 
the calendar-time event portfolio. This is referred to as the ―joint-test problem‖ by Fama (1970) 
since any test of this kind will be a joint test of market efficiency and the underlying asset-
pricing model. SMB denotes the difference between a ―small‖ and a ―large‖ stock portfolio, and 
HML denotes the difference between a ―high‖ and a ―low‖ BE/ME stock portfolio.   
 
Table 5 reports the regression results of the calendar-time portfolios on the Fama and French 
three factors. Panel A shows the results when the internal capital allocation efficiency is based on 
net subsidy; and Panel B reports the results when the internal capital allocation efficiency is 
based on sum of subsidy and transfer. All of the α on these regressions are not significant, which 
is indicative that the market is rather efficient in absorbing the effects of the acquisitions at or 
around their announcements.  
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Table 5:  
            Portfolio Regressions of Acquirers based on Calendar-time and Fama and French  
Three-Factor Model  
         
            
 The equation is:                                                                                                                          
where Rp is the mean event portfolio return for month t, equally weighted.  Rm-Rf, SMB, and 
HML are the Fama and French (1993) three factors. The research factor data are downloaded from 
French's website. ICMS: internal capital allocation is based on net subsidy. ICM: internal capital 
allocation is based on sum of subsidy and transfer.  
 
 
      
Coefficients 
   
      a   Rm-Rf   SMB   HML   
Adjusted 
R
2
 
            ICMS inefficient firms -0.0021 
 
1.129 a 0.604 a 0.381 a 0.641 
   
(-.830) 
 
(17.571) 
 
(7.806) 
 
(3.976) 
 
N=248 
            ICMS inactive firms -0.00116 
 
1.215 a 0.26 a 0.623 a 0.711 
   
(-.579) 
 
(23.984) 
 
(4.236) 
 
(8.233) 
 
N=251 
            ICMS efficient firms -0.00111 
 
1.241 a 0.696 a 0.337 
 
0.328 
   
(-.187) 
 
(8.374) 
 
(3.848) 
 
(1.484) 
 
N=215 
                        
            Panel B:  
          
      
Coefficients 
   
      a   Rm-Rf   SMB   HML   
Adjusted 
R
2
 
            ICM inefficient firms -0.00183 
 
1.118 a 0.592 a 0.362 a 0.644 
   
(-.734) 
 
(17.664) 
 
(7.764) 
 
(3.835) 
 
N=248 
            ICM inactive firms -0.00116 
 
1.215 a 0.26 a 0.623 a 0.711 
   
(-.579) 
 
(23.984) 
 
(4.236) 
 
(8.233) 
 
N=251 
            ICM efficient firms 0.00028 
 
1.188 a 0.589 a 0.33 c 0.375 
   
(.057) 
 
(9.609) 
 
(3.897) 
 
(1.740) 
 
N=219 
                        
            a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
    t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
      
             
tptptptftmpptftp eHMLhSMBsRRbaRR ,,,,, )( 
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5.3       Measuring the Excess Value of the Acquirers 
It has been well documented that diversification causes conglomerate firms to be traded as a 
discount. Our argument is that diversification itself does not necessarily cause a discount, but 
diversification by the ICM inefficient firms will work against the interest of the shareholders. We 
empirically test this hypothesis by computing the pre-announcement year (using the year-end 
data prior to the year of the acquisition announcement) imputed excess value for the ICM 
efficient and inefficient conglomerate acquirers. If the imputed value does correctly price the 
value of a conglomerate firm versus single segment firms, then we will expect to find higher 
(lower) excess value for ICM efficient (inefficient) firms. However, if systematic mispricing 
arising from different firm characteristics of single segment firms and conglomerate firms does 
exist in the imputed value approach, we can still infer evidence by comparing the difference 
between the mean excess values of the efficient and inefficient firm groups. This is under the 
assumption that both the ICM efficient and inefficient firms are equally systematically mispriced. 
If this is true, then the difference between the mean excess values measure the net effect of the 
firm‘s management efficiency on firm value. We predict the mean excess value of the ICM 
efficient firms be higher than that of the inefficient firms.  
 
Next we impute firm‘s excess value three years after the acquisition. Since we hypothesize that 
ICM efficient (inefficient) firms make value-enhancing (reducing) acquisitions, we expect the 
ICM efficient (inefficient) firms to have a positive (negative) change in their excess values. The 
change in excess value, EV, is measured by the difference of the excess value at year 3 minus 
the pre-announcement year excess value of the firm.  
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Table 6a describes the mean excess value for net subsidy inefficient, inactive, and efficient firms. 
Results in Panel A of Table 6a show that in the pre-announcement year, the mean excess value 
for the net subsidy inactive firms is significantly (at 1% level) greater than zero, no matter the 
imputed value is based on sales multiples or asset multiples. While the mean excess values for 
the inefficient and efficient firms are not significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Table 
7a provides information on the differences in group mean excess values between inefficient and 
efficient firms, between inefficient and inactive firms, and between inactive and efficient firms. 
From the results in Panel A of Table 7a, we can see that in the pre-announcement year, the group 
of net subsidy inactive firms has significant higher mean excess value when compared to both 
the group of inefficient firms and the group of efficient firms. However the mean excess values 
between the groups of inefficient and efficient firms are not significantly different from each 
other.  
 
Panel B of Table 6a shows the mean excess value information for each group three years after 
the merger announcement year. We can see that the mean excess value for the net subsidy 
inactive firms is still significantly (1%) greater than zero based on both sales and asset multiples. 
Although the mean excess value for the inactive firm group has dropped from the pre-
announcement year to three years after (Panel C shows the changes in mean excess values from 
year (-1) to year (+3)), the decrease is not statistically significant. While when using asset 
multiples, the mean excess value for the group of efficient firms three years after the 
announcement year (0.2297) becomes significantly greater than zero at the 10% level; and this 
value is even greater than that for the inactive firms (0.1197). If we look at the change in excess 
values for the efficient group, the excess values improve after the merger, although not  
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Table 6a: 
       
        Mean Excess Value for ICMS Inefficient, Inactive, and Efficient Firms  
  (Internal Capital Allocation Based On Net Subsidy) 
     
        
 
  ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
 
  Inefficient Inactive 
 
Efficient 
     Firms   Firms   Firms   
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples 0.0692 
 
0.1879 a -0.1076 
 
 
P-value (.121) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.284) 
 
 
N 129 
 
217 
 
25 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples 0.0466 
 
0.1823 a 0.0259 
 
 
P-value (.174) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.740) 
 
 
N 105 
 
168 
 
20 
                 
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples 0.0112 
 
0.1398 a 0.0422 
 
 
P-value (.825) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.799) 
 
 
N 72 
 
125 
 
15 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.0063 
 
0.1197 a 0.2297 c 
 
P-value (.893) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.065) 
 
 
N 60 
 
104 
 
11 
                 
 
  
      Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
Using sales multiples -0.0415 
 
-0.0206 
 
0.2672 
 
 
P-value (.424) 
 
(.628) 
 
(.168) 
 
 
N 67 
 
123 
 
15 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.0424 
 
-0.0584 
 
0.0264 
 
 
P-value (.352) 
 
(.176) 
 
(.857) 
 
 
N 55 
 
84 
 
8 
                 
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
    a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
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Table 6b: 
       
        Mean Excess Value for ICM Inefficient, Inactive, and Efficient Firms  
  (Internal Capital Allocation Based On Sum of Subsidy and Transfer) 
   
        
 
  ICM 
 
ICM 
 
ICM 
 
 
  Inefficient Inactive 
 
Efficient 
     Firms   Firms   Firms   
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples 0.0609 
 
0.1879 a -0.0646 
 
 
P-value (.169) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.541) 
 
 
N 129 
 
217 
 
25 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples 0.0375 
 
0.1823 a 0.0741 
 
 
P-value (.259) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.416) 
 
 
N 105 
 
168 
 
20 
                 
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples 0.0112 
 
0.1398 a 0.0422 
 
 
P-value (.825) 
 
(.004) 
 
(.799) 
 
 
N 72 
 
125 
 
15 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.0063 
 
0.1197 a 0.2297 c 
 
P-value (.893) 
 
(.010) 
 
(.065) 
 
 
N 60 
 
104 
 
11 
                 
 
  
      Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
Using sales multiples -0.0415 
 
-0.0206 
 
0.2672 
 
 
P-value (.424) 
 
(.628) 
 
(.168) 
 
 
N 67 
 
123 
 
15 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.0424 
 
-0.0584 
 
0.0264 
 
 
P-value (.352) 
 
(.176) 
 
(.857) 
 
 
N 55 
 
84 
 
8 
                 
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
    a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
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statistically significant. For the group of inefficient firms, the mean excess values decrease after 
the merger, although not significantly so either.  
 
Investigating Panel B of Table 7a, we will find that three years after the merger announcement, 
the efficient group has a significantly (at 10% level) higher mean excess value compared to the 
inefficient group when using asset multiples. When compared to the inactive firms, the 
inefficient group has significant lower (at 10% level) mean excess values too. However, three 
years after the merger announcement, the mean excess values between the inactive and the 
efficient groups become insignificant. Considering the fact that inactive firm group has a 
significantly higher mean excess value comparing to the efficient firm group in the pre-
announcement year, this shows evidence that the efficient firms are catching up after the merger.  
 
In summary, the results in Table 6a and Table 7a lead us to the following findings. First, both net 
subsidy efficient and inefficient firms have lower excess values compared to the inactive firms 
before the merger announcement. Second, three years after the merger announcement, the excess 
values of the inefficient and inactive group decrease, whereas that of the efficient group 
increases, although neither the decrease nor the increase is significant. Third, efficient firms 
seem to be catching up with the inactive firms (in terms of excess values) three years after the 
merger announcement. Not only so, if we look at the results based on asset multiples, the 
efficient firms are exceeding the inactive firms in terms of excess values (although it is not 
statistically significant). Whereas the inefficient firm group remains in the lower excess value 
position, and its mean excess value continues to decrease after the merger.  
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Table 7a: 
       
        Difference in Mean Excess Value Between Groups  
     (Internal Capital Allocation Based On Net Subsidy) 
     
        
 
  (Inefficient  (Inefficient (Inactive 
    - Efficient)  - Inactive)  - Efficient) 
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples 0.1768 
 
-0.1187 b 0.2955 a 
 
P-value (0.109) 
 
(.027) 
 
(.003) 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples 0.0208 
 
-0.1357 a 0.1564 c 
 
P-value (0.808) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.059) 
 
 
  
                      
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples -0.031 
 
-0.1286 c 0.0976 
 
 
P-value (.858) 
 
(.066) 
 
(.514) 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.2361 c -0.1261 c -0.11 
 
 
P-value (.052) 
 
(.056) 
 
(.450) 
 
 
  
                      
 
  
      Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
Using sales multiples -0.3087 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.288 b 
 
P-value (0.125) 
 
(.762) 
 
(.037) 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.0688 
 
0.016 
 
-0.0848 
 
 
P-value (.598) 
 
(.804) 
 
(.561) 
 
 
  
                      
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
    a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
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Table 7b: 
       
        Difference in Mean Excess Value Between Groups  
     (Internal Capital Allocation Based On Sum of Subsidy and Transfer) 
   
        
 
  (Inefficient  (Inefficient (Inactive 
     - Efficient)  - Inactive)  - Efficient) 
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples 0.1255 
 
-0.127 b 0.2525 b 
 
P-value (.256) 
 
(.017) 
 
(.012) 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.0366 
 
-0.1449 a 0.1082 
 
 
P-value (.667) 
 
(.001) 
 
(.198) 
 
 
  
                      
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement year 
      
 
Using sales multiples -0.031 
 
-0.1286 c 0.0976 
 
 
P-value (.858) 
 
(.066) 
 
(.514) 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.2361 c -0.1261 c -0.11 
 
 
P-value (.052) 
 
(.058) 
 
(.450) 
 
 
  
                      
 
  
      Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
Using sales multiples -0.3087 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.2878 b 
 
P-value (.125) 
 
(.762) 
 
(.037) 
 
 
  
      
 
Using asset multiples -0.0688 
 
0.016 
 
-0.0848 
 
 
P-value (.598) 
 
(.804) 
 
(.561) 
 
 
  
                      
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
    a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
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Another noteworthy finding is that despite the well-documented ―diversification discount‖, our 
sample of ICMS inactive firms has significantly positive excess values before the acquisitions. 
This indicates that these firms are comparatively winners in the market. Therefore it seems 
reasonable that they are having inactive internal capital allocations - since they may have ample 
financing for their investments so that they do not have to rely on internal capital allocation 
subsidies and transfers. However, for the ICMS inefficient and efficient firms, their excess 
values are not significantly positive (there is even a negative value) before the acquisitions, 
therefore, the existence of internal capital allocation becomes more important for these firms. If 
firms can use this venue efficiently, they can reap benefits from their internal capital allocations. 
This is demonstrated by the evidence of our ICMS efficient firms – they receive both a positive 
announcement period CAR and an improvement in excess value following the acquisitions. 
However, if firms cannot use this venue efficiently, they will not be able to enjoy the benefits of 
their internal capital allocations.  
 
Table 6b shows the mean excess values for ICM inefficient, inactive, and efficient firms when 
the internal capital allocation values are based on the net effect of subsidies and transfers within 
each firm. And Table 7b shows the corresponding differences in mean excess values between 
groups. The results in these two tables are largely consistent with our findings derived from 
Tables 6a and 7a.  
 
To detect whether internal capital allocation efficiency is a main contributor to the change in 
excess values, we regress the acquirer‘s change in excess values on several dummy variables 
(including ICM efficiency as well as ICM inefficiency, all cash financing, and relatedness of the 
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merger) as well as control variables. Three additional control variables are added: 1) Leverage – 
defined as the ratio of book value of debt to total assets; 2) Liquidity – defined as the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities to total assets; and 3) Profitability – defined as the ratio of total 
consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets. Table 8a shows 
the regression results when internal capital allocation is based on net subsidy and excess value is 
based on sales multiples; and Table 9a presents the results when internal capital allocation is 
based on net subsidy and excess value is based on asset multiples
4
. Within each table, part (I) 
shows the regression results on all of the dummy and control variables; (II) shows the results 
when relatedness effect is ruled out; and (III) shows the results when method of payments effect 
is ruled out. All of these regressions report the predicted signs for the coefficients on the internal 
capital allocation efficiency components. And when excess value is based on sales multiples, the 
coefficient on the efficient internal capital allocation component is significantly greater than zero 
at 10% level. While the coefficient of the method of payment and relatedness dummies are not 
statistically significant. These regressions again imply that the internal capital allocation 
efficiency effect is dominating the method of payment and the relatedness effects in improving 
the acquirers‘ excess value after acquisitions.  
 
We further classify sample firms into two groups: firms having negative ICM(S) values as 
ICM(S) inefficient firms and the rest of the firms as ICM(S) efficient firms, and run the 
regressions again. Table 8b shows the regression results when ICM is based on net subsidy and 
excess value is based on sales multiples; and Table 9b reports the results when ICM is based on 
net subsidy and excess value is based on asset multiples. In these regressions, we include one 
                                                 
4
 Since for this part of the analysis, the regression results based on ICMS (ICM based on net subsidy) or ICM (ICM 
based on the sum of subsidy and transfer) are the same for each set of the analysis, we choose to report only one of 
the results (based on ICMS). 
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dummy variable for ICMS inefficient firms. The results show that the coefficient on the 
inefficient ICMS dummy is negative, although not statistically significant.  
 
Table 8a: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Excess Value on Characteristics of the Match  
and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy; 
  Excess Value Based on Sales Multiples) 
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in excess value (based on sales multiples) from the 
pre-announcement year to three years after the announcement year.  Firm size is the log of total assets. 
Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Market value of 
equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.  
Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable 
securities to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before interest, 
taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
    Acquirer's Change in Excess Value      
  
(=  EV in year(+3) - EV in year (-1)) 
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
-0.955 a -0.955 a -0.96 a 
  
(-3.550) 
 
(-3.559) 
 
(-3.575) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.242 c 0.242 c 0.248 c 
Market Is Efficient (ICMS>0) (1.883) 
 
(1.889) 
 
(1.951) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.0448 
 
-0.0448 
 
-0.0447 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-0.610) 
 
(-0.611) 
 
(-0.609) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.0319 
 
-0.0319 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.470) 
 
(-0.472) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  0.00005 
   
0.00215 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (0.001) 
   
(0.032) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.04003 c 0.04003 c 0.039 c 
  
(1.900) 
 
(1.908) 
 
(1.865) 
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Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.518 a 0.518 a 0.51 a 
  
(4.428) 
 
(4.489) 
 
(4.418) 
 
        Leverage 
 
507 b 0.507 b 0.518 b 
  
(2.423) 
 
(2.431) 
 
(2.492) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
-0.0316 
 
-0.0316 
 
-0.0449 
 
  
(-0.086) 
 
(-0.086) 
 
(-0.122) 
 
        Profitability 
 
0.883 
 
0.883 
 
0.861 
 
  
(1.588) 
 
(1.596) 
 
(1.556) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
205 
 
205 
 
205 
 
        R
2
 
 
0.128 
 
0.128 
 
0.127 
 Adjusted R
2
   0.088   0.093   0.092   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
         
 
Table 8b: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Excess Value on Characteristics of the Match  
and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy; 
  Excess Value Based on Sales Multiples) 
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in excess value (based on sales multiples) from 
the pre-announcement year to three years after the announcement year.  Firm size is the log of 
total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. 
Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by the number of 
shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the 
ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of total 
consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
    Acquirer's Change in Excess Value      
  
(=  EV in year(+3) - EV in year (-1)) 
Variable Name   I   II   III   
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       Intercept 
 
-0.911 a -0.911 a -0.915 a 
  
(-3.376) 
 
(-3.384) 
 
(-3.399) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.077 
 
-0.0771 
 
-0.0781 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-1.070) 
 
(-1.074) 
 
(-1.087) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.046 
 
-0.0463 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.678) 
 
(-0.685) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  0.00376 
   
0.00697 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (0.056) 
   
(0.104) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.0401 c 0.0402 c 0.0386 c 
  
(1.892) 
 
(1.902) 
 
(1.833) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.534 a 0.535 a 0.522 a 
  
(4.544) 
 
(4.617) 
 
(4.500) 
 
        Leverage 
 
0.512 b 0.512 b 0.527 b 
  
(2.430) 
 
(2.438) 
 
(2.521) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
-0.0694 
 
-0.0699 
 
-0.0904 
 
  
(-0.188) 
 
(-0.189) 
 
(-0.245) 
 
        Profitability 
 
0.765 
 
0.767 
 
0.728 
 
  
(1.376) 
 
(1.386) 
 
(1.317) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
205 
 
205 
 
205 
 
        R
2
 
 
0.112 
 
0.112 
 
0.11 
 Adjusted R
2
   0.076   0.081   0.079   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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Table 9a: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Excess Value on Characteristics of the Match 
and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy;  
 Excess Value Based on Asset Multiples) 
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in excess value (based on asset multiples) from the 
pre-announcement year to three years after the announcement year.  Firm size is the log of total 
assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Market 
value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash 
plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings 
before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
    Acquirer's Change in Excess Value      
  
(=  EV in year(+3) - EV in year (-1)) 
  Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
-0.679 b -0.678 b -0.679 b 
  
(-2.466) 
 
(-2.471) 
 
(-2.477) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.0737 
 
0.07043 
 
0.07426 
 Market Is Efficient (ICMS>0) (0.519) 
 
(0.503) 
 
(0.529) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.00372 
 
-0.00348 
 
-0.00376 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-0.055) 
 
(-0.052) 
 
(-0.056) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.00205 
 
-0.00114 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.031) 
 
(-0.017) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  -0.0105 
   
-0.0104 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-0.164) 
   
(-0.163) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.05167 b 0.05125 b 0.05156 b 
  
(2.536) 
 
(2.545) 
 
(2.576) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.304 b 0.3 b 0.303 b 
  
(2.290) 
 
(2.306) 
 
(2.357) 
 
        Leverage 
 
0.163 
 
0.162 
 
0.163 
 
  
(0.673) 
 
(0.671) 
 
(0.678) 
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Liquidity 
 
0.264 
 
0.26 
 
0.262 
 
  
(0.428) 
 
(0.424) 
 
(0.428) 
 
        Profitability 
 
0.1 
 
0.09734 
 
0.0986 
 
  
(0.180) 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.179) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
147 
 
147 
 
147 
 
        R
2
 
 
0.077 
 
0.077 
 
0.077 
 Adjusted R
2
   0.016   0.023   0.023   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
 
 
 
Table 9b: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Excess Value on Characteristics of the Match 
and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy;  
 Excess Value Based on Asset Multiples) 
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in excess value (based on asset multiples) from the 
pre-announcement year to three years after the announcement year.  Firm size is the log of total 
assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Market 
value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash 
plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings 
before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
    Acquirer's Change in Excess Value      
  
(=  EV in year(+3) - EV in year (-1)) 
 Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
-0.676 b -0.675 b -0.674 b 
  
(2.461) 
 
(-2.468) 
 
(-2.468) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.0109 
 
-0.0106 
 
-0.0112 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-0.165) 
 
(-0.161) 
 
(-0.170) 
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       Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.00637 
 
-0.00574 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.098) 
 
(-0.089) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  -0.00588 
   
-0.00524 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-0.093) 
   
(-0.083) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.05061 b 0.05039 b 0.05025 b 
  
(2.503) 
 
(2.518) 
 
(2.537) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
0.314 b 0.312 b 0.311 b 
  
(2.403) 
 
(2.446) 
 
(2.450) 
 
        Leverage 
 
0.173 
 
0.172 
 
0.175 
 
  
(0.718) 
 
(0.718) 
 
(0.730) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
0.251 
 
0.249 
 
0.246 
 
  
(0.408) 
 
(0.407) 
 
(0.404) 
 
        Profitability 
 
0.105 
 
0.104 
 
0.09974 
 
  
(0.190) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.181) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
147 
 
147 
 
147 
 
        R
2
 
 
0.075 
 
0.075 
 
0.075 
 Adjusted R
2
   0.022   0.029   0.029   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
         
 
5.4       Measuring the Operating Performance of the Acquirers 
We further investigate the operating performance of the acquirers before and after the 
acquisitions. Two measures of operating performance are included in this study: the first one is 
the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total assets (EBITD/AT); and the 
second one is the ratio of sales to total assets (SALE/AT).  To make the results comparable to the 
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excess value analysis, we examine the operating performance of the acquirers in the pre-
announcement year and in three years after the announcement year (for example, if the merger is 
announced in 1992, we examine the acquirer‘s operating performance in fiscal year end of 1991, 
and 1995). Then we investigate the change in operating performance during these years; as well 
as the between-group differences. Finally we run a regression to find out the effect of internal 
capital allocation efficiency on the change of operating performance from pre-announcement 
year to three years after. 
 
Table 10a reports the mean operating performance for ICMS (ICM based on net subsidy) 
inefficient, inactive, and efficient firms. In the pre-announcement year (year -1), both operating 
performance measures for all three ICMS groups are significantly greater than zero. Three years 
after the announcement year (year +3), all remain positively significant except for the 
EBITD/AT measure for the ICMS inefficient firms (which drops to insignificant). All of these 
measures demonstrate a decrease from [year -1] to [year +3], however, it is significantly 
decreasing for ICMS inefficient firms (using SALE/AT measure) and for ICMS inactive firms 
(both measures); whereas insignificant for the ICMS efficient firms using both measures.  
 
Table 10b reports the mean operating performance for ICM (ICM based on sum of subsidy and 
transfer) inefficient, inactive, and efficient firms. These results demonstrate the same pattern as 
depicted in table 10a.  
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Table 10a: 
       
        Mean Operating Performance Measures for ICMS Inefficient, Inactive, and Efficient 
 Firms (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy)  
   
        
 
  ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
ICMS 
 
 
  Inefficient Inactive 
 
Efficient 
     Firms   Firms   Firms   
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
EBITD/AT 0.1263 a 0.1737 a 0.1483 a 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 136 
 
223 
 
25 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT 1.1119 a 1.1671 a 1.1637 a 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 136 
 
223 
 
25 
                 
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement 
year 
      
 
EBITD/AT 0.0247 
 
0.14 a 0.1405 a 
 
P-value (.772) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 94 
 
169 
 
18 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT 0.9926 a 1.0251 a 1.1827 a 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 95 
 
169 
 
18 
                 
 
  
      Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.1116 
 
-0.0365 a -0.0044 
 
 
P-value (.196) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.804) 
 
 
N 94 
 
169 
 
18 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.1851 a -0.173 a -0.0623 
 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.773) 
 
 
N 95 
 
169 
 
18 
                 
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
   a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
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Table 10b: 
        Mean Operating Performance Measures for ICMS Inefficient, Inactive, and Efficient  
Firms (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of Subsidy and Transfer)  
 
        
 
  ICM 
 
ICM 
 
ICM 
 
 
  Inefficient Inactive 
 
Efficient 
     Firms   Firms   Firms   
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
EBITD/AT 0.1268 a 0.1737 a 0.1457 a 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 136 
 
223 
 
25 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT 1.1119 a 1.1671 a 1.164 a 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 136 
 
223 
 
25 
                 
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement 
year 
      
 
EBITD/AT 0.026 
 
0.14 a 0.1404 a 
 
P-value (.758) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 95 
 
169 
 
17 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT 0.9857 a 1.0251 a 1.2327 a 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
 
N 96 
 
169 
 
17 
                 
 
  
      Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.1107 
 
-0.0365 a -0.0029 
 
 
P-value (.195) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.876) 
 
 
N 95 
 
169 
 
17 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.1855 a -0.173 a -0.053 
 
 
P-value (.000) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.817) 
 
 
N 96 
 
169 
 
17 
                 
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
   a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
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Table 11a reports the difference in mean operating performance between groups. Panel A shows 
that in the pre-announcement year, the ICMS inactive firms have significantly higher EBITD/AT 
ratio than both the ICMS inefficient and efficient firms. However, three years after the 
announcement year, these differences become insignificant; moreover, the ICMS efficient firms 
are having higher operating performance compared to the inactive firms. Table 11b shows the 
corresponding results when internal capital allocation measure is based on sum of subsidy and 
transfer. Again, these results are largely consistent with each other no matter the internal capital 
allocation is based on net subsidy or on sum of subsidy and transfer.  
 
Table 11a:  
       
        Difference in Mean Operating Performance Measures Between Groups  
 (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy)  
    
        
 
  (Inefficient  (Inefficient (Inactive 
     - Efficient)  - Inactive)  - Efficient) 
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.0221 
 
-0.0474 a 0.0254 c 
 
P-value (.153) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.064) 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.0518 
 
-0.0552 
 
0.0035 
 
 
P-value (.732) 
 
(.397) 
 
(.978) 
 
 
  
                      
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement year 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.1158 
 
-0.1153 
 
-0.0005 
 
 
P-value (.554) 
 
(.179) 
 
(.975) 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.1901 
 
-0.0325 
 
-0.1576 
 
 
P-value (.420) 
 
(.637) 
 
(.491) 
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Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.1072 
 
-0.0751 
 
-0.0321 c 
 
P-value (.587) 
 
(.384) 
 
(.064) 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.1228 
 
-0.0121 
 
-0.1107 
 
 
P-value (.576) 
 
(.793) 
 
(.611) 
 
 
  
                      
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
   a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
         
Table 11b:  
       
        Difference in Mean Operating Performance Measures Between Groups  
 (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of Subsidy and Transfer)  
  
        
 
  (Inefficient  (Inefficient (Inactive 
     - Efficient)  - Inactive)  - Efficient) 
 
  
      Panel A: Pre-Announcement year 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.0189 
 
-0.0469 a 0.028 b 
 
P-value (.220) 
 
(.000) 
 
(.041) 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.0521 
 
-0.0553 
 
0.0032 
 
 
P-value (.731) 
 
(.396) 
 
(.980) 
 
 
  
                      
 
  
      Panel B: 3 years after the announcement year 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.1145 
 
-0.114 
 
-0.0004 
 
 
P-value (.568) 
 
(.179) 
 
(.980) 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.247 
 
-0.0394 
 
-0.2076 
 
 
P-value (.312) 
 
(.567) 
 
(.382) 
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Panel C: Net Change (=year (+3) - year (-1)) 
      
 
EBITD/AT -0.1078 
 
-0.0742 
 
-0.0336 c 
 
P-value (.593) 
 
(.384) 
 
(.060) 
 
 
  
      
 
SALE/AT -0.1325 
 
-0.0125 
 
-0.12 
 
 
P-value (.569) 
 
(.786) 
 
(.603) 
 
 
  
                      
        Note: Value in parenthesis is the P-value of a 2-tailed T test.  
   a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
         
 
Table 12a-b and Table 13a-b report the results of regressing the change in operating performance 
on characteristics of the match and the acquiring firms. Table 12a shows the results when ICM is 
based on net subsidy and operating performance is based on EBITD/AT. Table 12b presents us 
the results when ICM is based on sum of subsidy and transfer and operating performance is 
based on EBITD/AT. Table 13a reports the results when ICM is based on net subsidy and 
operating performance is based on SALE/AT. And Table 13b shows the results when ICM is 
based on sum of subsidy and transfer and operating performance is based on SALE/AT. 
Summarizing all these results, we can see that when operating performance is based on 
SALES/AT, The coefficient on the inefficient internal capital allocation component is 
significantly less than zero (at 10 percent level) no matter ICM is based on net subsidy or sum of 
subsidy and transfer. And when operating performance is based on EBITD/AT, the coefficients 
on the internal capital allocation components exhibit the predicted signs as well, although not 
statistically significant. However, the effects of the method of payment and relatedness on the 
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change in operating performance are not significant. These results reinforce that internal capital 
allocation efficiency is a dominating factor in the success of acquisitions.    
 
We further modify the classification of our sample firms into ICM(S) efficient firms (ICM(S) 
value greater or equal to zero) and ICM(S) inefficient firms (ICM(S) value less than zero) and 
repeat the above regression analysis. Table 12c shows the results when ICM is based on net 
subsidy and operating performance is based on EBITD/AT. Table 12d reports the results when 
ICM is based on sum of subsidy and transfer and operating performance is based on EBITD/AT. 
Table 13a presents the results when ICM is based on net subsidy and operating performance is 
based on SALE/AT. And Table 13b shows the results when ICM is based on sum of subsidy and 
transfer and operating performance is based on SALE/AT. In these regressions, we include one 
dummy for ICM(S) inefficient firms. All of these regressions show that the coefficients on the 
ICM(S) inefficiency dummy is significantly less than zero at 10 percent level or above.  
 
 
Table 12a: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy; 
 Operating Performance Based on EBITD/AT) 
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in EBITD/AT from the pre-announcement year to 
three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)).  Firm 
size is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. 
Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability (also as 
EBITD/AT) is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation 
to total assets.  
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      Acquirer's Change in EBITD/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.286 
 
0.283 
 
0.281 
 
  
(1.158) 
 
(1.142) 
 
(1.137) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.04975 
 
0.04439 
 
0.03991 
 Market Is Efficient (ICMS>0) (0.407) 
 
(0.363) 
 
(0.329) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.109 
 
-0.108 
 
-0.107 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-1.629) 
 
(-1.618) 
 
(-1.604) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.04668 
 
0.05582 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.747) 
 
(0.898) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquirer and  -0.0756 
   
-0.0809 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.245) 
   
(-1.343) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.0221 
 
0.02 
 
0.02424 
 
  
(1.145) 
 
(1.039) 
 
(1.271) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.0931 
 
-0.114 
 
-0.0763 
 
  
(-0.818) 
 
(-1.008) 
 
(-0.684) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.4 b -0.403 b -0.411 b 
  
(-2.055) 
 
(-2.067) 
 
(-2.120) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
0.07325 
 
0.08695 
 
0.09064 
 
  
(0.216) 
 
(0.256) 
 
(0.268) 
 
        Profitability 
 
-1.24 b -1.267 b -1.19 b 
  
(-2.433) 
 
(-2.488) 
 
(-2.358) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.053 
 
0.048 
 
0.051 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.021   0.019   0.023   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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        Table 12b: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of Subsidy  
and Transfer; Operating Performance Based on EBITD/AT) 
   
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in EBITD/AT from the pre-announcement year to 
three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)).  Firm 
size is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by 
the number of shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. 
Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability (also as 
EBITD/AT) is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation 
to total assets.  
      Acquirer's Change in EBITD/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.284 
 
0.281 
 
0.279 
 
  
(1.151) 
 
(1.136) 
 
(1.131) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.04972 
 
0.04647 
 
0.04057 
 Market Is Efficient (ICM>0) (0.397) 
 
(0.371) 
 
(0.326) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.107 
 
-0.107 
 
-0.105 
 Market Is Inefficient (ICM<0) (-1.605) 
 
(-1.602) 
 
(-1.584) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.04558 
 
0.05473 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.730) 
 
(0.882) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquirer and  
 
-0.0742 
   
-0.0795 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.224) 
   
(-1.322) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.02232 
 
0.02024 
 
0.0244 
 
  
(1.156) 
 
(1.052) 
 
(1.279) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.0931 
 
-0.113 
 
-0.0767 
 
  
(-0.818) 
 
(-1.006) 
 
(-0.688) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.401 b -0.404 b -0.412 b 
  
(-2.060) 
 
(-2.072) 
 
(-2.123) 
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       Liquidity 
 
0.07321 
 
0.08663 
 
0.09022 
 
  
(0.216) 
 
(0.255) 
 
(0.267) 
 
        Profitability 
 
-1.236 b -1.263 b -1.188 b 
  
(-2.426) 
 
(-2.480) 
 
(-2.353) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.053 
 
0.047 
 
0.051 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.021   0.019   0.022   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
         
 
Table 12c: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy; 
 Operating Performance Based on EBITD/AT)  
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in EBITD/AT from the pre-announcement year 
to three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)).  
Firm size is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to 
total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability 
(also as EBITD/AT) is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation to total assets.  
      Acquirer's Change in EBITD/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.291 
 
0.287 
 
0.285 
 
  
(1.179) 
 
(1.161) 
 
(1.156) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.115 c -0.114 c -0.112 c 
Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-1.759) 
 
(-1.739) 
 
(-1.721) 
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       Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.04394 
 
0.05327 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.708) 
 
(0.864) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquirer and  -0.0747 
   
-0.0799 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.234) 
   
(-1.331) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.02195 
 
0.01989 
 
0.02402 
 
  
(1.139) 
 
(1.035) 
 
(1.262) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.0883 
 
-0.109 
 
-0.0732 
 
  
(-0.781) 
 
(-0.976) 
 
(-0.660) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.396 b -0.399 b -0.407 b 
  
(-2.039) 
 
(-2.053) 
 
(-2.107) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
0.06965 
 
0.0836 
 
0.08689 
 
  
(0.206) 
 
(0.247) 
 
(0.257) 
 
        Profitability 
 
-1.251 b -1.277 b -1.202 b 
  
(-2.463) 
 
(-2.514) 
 
(-2.391) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.053 
 
0.047 
 
0.051 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.024   0.022   0.026   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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Table 12d: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of Subsidy  
and Transfer; Operating Performance Based on EBITD/AT) 
   
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in EBITD/AT from the pre-announcement year to 
three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)).  Firm 
size is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by 
the number of shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. 
Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability (also as 
EBITD/AT) is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation 
to total assets.  
      Acquirer's Change in EBITD/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.289 
 
0.285 
 
0.283 
 
  
(1.172) 
 
(1.156) 
 
(1.150) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.113 c -0.112 c -0.11 c 
Market Is Inefficient (ICM<0) (-1.731) 
 
(-1.722) 
 
(-1.697) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  0.0431 
 
0.05236 
   Cash Financed 
 
(0.695) 
 
(0.850) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquirer and  
 
-0.0737 
   
-0.0789 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.218) 
   
(-1.314) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.02212 
 
0.02007 
 
0.02414 
 
  
(1.148) 
 
(1.045) 
 
(1.269) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.0885 
 
-0.109 
 
-0.0736 
 
  
(-0.783) 
 
(-0.974) 
 
(-0.664) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.396 b -0.399 b -0.407 b 
  
(-2.043) 
 
(-2.057) 
 
(-2.109) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
0.06988 
 
0.08343 
 
0.08671 
 
  
(0.206) 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.257) 
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Profitability 
 
-1.247 b -1.274 b -1.199 b 
  
(-2.455) 
 
(-2.508) 
 
(-2.385) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.052 
 
0.047 
 
0.051 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.024   0.022   0.026   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
       Table 13a: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy; 
 Operating Performance Based on SALE/AT)  
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in SALE/AT from the pre-announcement year to 
three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)). SALE/AT 
is the ratio of firm sales to total assets. Firm size is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is 
the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as 
the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio 
of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total 
assets. Profitability (also as EBITD/AT) is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before 
interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
      Acquirer's Change in SALE/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.411 b 0.409 b 0.413 b 
  
(2.193) 
 
(2.180) 
 
(2.206) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.06642 
 
0.06292 
 
0.06918 
 Market Is Efficient (ICMS>0) (0.716) 
 
(0.679) 
 
(0.752) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.0892 c -0.0888 c -0.0897 c 
Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-1.758) 
 
(-1.750) 
 
(-1.772) 
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Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.0131 
 
-0.00712 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.276) 
 
(-0.151) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquiror and  -0.0493 
   
-0.0478 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.071) 
   
(-1.047) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.00779 
 
0.00642 
 
0.00719 
 
  
(0.532) 
 
(0.440) 
 
(0.497) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.0654 
 
-0.0567 
 
  
(-0.602) 
 
(-0.765) 
 
(-0.671) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.377 b -0.379 b -0.374 b 
  
(-2.551) 
 
(-2.562) 
 
(-2.542) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
0.329 
 
0.338 
 
0.324 
 
  
(1.278) 
 
(1.313) 
 
(1.264) 
 
        Profitability 
 
-2.325 a -2.343 a -2.339 a 
  
(-6.013) 
 
(-6.064) 
 
(-6.111) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.18 
 
0.177 
 
0.18 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.153   0.152   0.156   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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Table 13b: 
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of Subsidy 
and Transfer; Operating Performance Based on SALE/AT)  
   
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in SALE/AT from the pre-announcement year to 
three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)). SALE/AT 
is the ratio of firm sales to total assets. Firm size is the log of total assets. Book-to-market ratio is 
the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Market value of equity is computed as 
the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio 
of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total 
assets. Profitability (also as EBITD/AT) is the ratio of total consolidated firm earnings before 
interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
      Acquirer's Change in SALE/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.41 b 0.408 b 0.412 b 
  
(2.188) 
 
(2.176) 
 
(2.201) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  0.07269 
 
0.07059 
 
0.07545 
 Market Is Efficient (ICM>0) (0.765) 
 
(0.743) 
 
(0.799) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.0885 c -0.0884 c -0.0889 c 
Market Is Inefficient (ICM<0) (-1.751) 
 
(-1.749) 
 
(-1.764) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.0138 
 
-0.00782 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.290) 
 
(-0.166) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquirer and  
 
-0.0481 
   
-0.0465 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.045) 
   
(-1.019) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.008 
 
0.00666 
 
0.00738 
 
  
(0.546) 
 
(0.456) 
 
(0.510) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.0522 
 
-0.0653 
 
-0.0572 
 
  
(-0.605) 
 
(-0.764) 
 
(-0.676) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.379 b -0.38 b -0.375 b 
  
(-2.563) 
 
(-2.575) 
 
(-2.552) 
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Liquidity 
 
0.329 
 
0.338 
 
0.324 
 
  
(1.277) 
 
(1.311) 
 
(1.262) 
 
        Profitability 
 
-2.323 a -2.341 a -2.337 a 
  
(-6.009) 
 
(-6.061) 
 
(-6.107) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.181 
 
0.177 
 
0.18 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.153   0.153   0.156   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
         
 
Table 13c: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Net Subsidy; 
 Operating Performance Based on SALE/AT) 
     
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in SALE/AT from the pre-announcement year 
to three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)). 
SALE/AT is the ratio of firm sales to total assets. Firm size is the log of total assets. Book-to-
market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Market value of 
equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability (also as EBITD/AT) is the ratio of 
total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
      Acquirer's Change in SALE/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.417 b 0.415 b 0.42 b 
  
(2.228) 
 
(2.214) 
 
(2.246) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.097 c -0.0962 c -0.0981 b 
Market Is Inefficient (ICMS<0) (-1.958) 
 
(-1.942) 
 
(-1.987) 
 
80 
 
        (Table Continued.) 
 
Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.0167 
 
-0.0107 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.355) 
 
(-0.229) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquirer and  -0.0481 
   
-0.0462 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.047) 
   
(-1.013) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.00759 
 
0.00626 
 
0.0068 
 
  
(0.519) 
 
(0.429) 
 
(0.471) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.0456 
 
-0.059 
 
-0.0514 
 
  
(-0.531) 
 
(-0.695) 
 
(-0.610) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.371 b -0.373 b -0.367 b 
  
(-2.518) 
 
(-2.531) 
 
(-2.501) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
0.324 
 
0.333 
 
0.318 
 
  
(1.261) 
 
(1.296) 
 
(1.240) 
 
        Profitability 
 
-2.34 a -2.357 a -2.359 a 
  
(-6.066) 
 
(-6.114) 
 
(-6.182) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.179 
 
0.175 
 
0.178 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.154   0.154   0.157   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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Table 13d: 
       
        Regression of Acquirer's Change in Operating Performance on Characteristics of the  
Match and the Acquiring Firm (Internal Capital Allocation Based on Sum of Subsidy 
and Transfer; Operating Performance Based on SALE/AT) 
   
        The dependent variable is the acquirer's change in SALE/AT from the pre-announcement year 
to three years after the announcement year (change = value in year(+3) - value in year(-1)). 
SALE/AT is the ratio of firm sales to total assets. Firm size is the log of total assets. Book-to-
market ratio is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Market value of 
equity is computed as the product of the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding.  Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash plus marketable securities to total assets. Profitability (also as EBITD/AT) is the ratio of 
total consolidated firm earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.  
      Acquirer's Change in SALE/AT   
Variable Name   I   II   III   
        Intercept 
 
0.417 b 0.415 b 0.419 b 
  
(2.226) 
 
(2.214) 
 
(2.244) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Internal Capital  -0.0966 c -0.0963 c -0.0976 b 
Market Is Inefficient (ICM<0) (-1.958) 
 
(-1.952) 
 
(-1.984) 
 
        Dummy = 1 if Deal is 100%  -0.0174 
 
-0.0114 
   Cash Financed 
 
(-0.369) 
 
(-0.244) 
   
        Dummy = 1 if Acquirer and  
 
-0.0473 
   
-0.0453 
 Target share a 4-Digit SIC Industry (-1.030) 
   
(-0.993) 
 
        Firm Size (Log of Total Asset) 0.00771 
 
0.00639 
 
0.0069 
 
  
(0.527) 
 
(0.439) 
 
(0.478) 
 
        Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
-0.0455 
 
-0.0586 
 
-0.0515 
 
  
(-0.529) 
 
(-0.690) 
 
(-0.611) 
 
        Leverage 
 
-0.372 b -0.374 b -0.367 b 
  
(-2.523) 
 
(-2.536) 
 
(-2.505) 
 
        Liquidity 
 
0.324 
 
0.333 
 
0.317 
 
  
(1.259) 
 
(1.294) 
 
(1.238) 
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Profitability 
 
-2.339 a -2.356 a -2.358 a 
  
(-6.065) 
 
(-6.115) 
 
(-6.181) 
 
        Number of Observations 
 
276 
 
276 
 
276 
 
        
R
2
 
 
0.179 
 
0.176 
 
0.178 
 
Adjusted R
2
   0.154   0.154   0.157   
        a: Significant at 1%; b: Significant at 5%; c: Significant at 10%. 
   t statistics is reported in the parenthesis. 
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VI.Conclusions 
 
 
Using a sample of multi-segment acquirers, this study investigates the role of internal capital 
allocation efficiency in the success of acquisitions. By dividing the sample firms into three 
groups based on their internal capital allocation efficiency (namely the ICM inefficient firms, 
ICM inactive firms, and ICM efficient firms), we conduct event studies, long-term studies, 
excess value analyses, and operating performance analyses surrounding the acquisition activities. 
The event study of event window (-3, +3) shows that ICM efficient firms have significantly 
positive announcement period CAR, while the ICM inefficient firms and ICM inactive firms 
have significantly negative CARs. Sub-group and regression results further reinforce that the 
effects of internal capital allocation efficiency on announcement period CAR dominate those of 
method of payment and relatedness. Long-term studies do not find significant mispricing over 
the three years following the acquisition completion, which indicates that the market is rather 
efficient in absorbing the effects of acquisitions at or around the announcement date and our 
measure of efficiency fully captures success of acquisition. One interesting finding with the 
excess value analyses is that the ICM inactive firms are having significantly higher mean excess 
value compared to the ICM inefficient firms and ICM efficient firms at the fiscal year end before 
the acquisition announcement. However, three years after the acquisition, the difference in 
excess value between ICM inactive and ICM efficient firms becomes insignificant, which 
indicates that the ICM efficient firms are able to catch up in terms of excess value after the 
acquisitions. With the change in excess value from year (-1) to year (+3) as the dependent 
variable, regression results show that the coefficient on the efficient internal capital allocation 
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component is significantly positive when excess value is based on sales multiples. This confirms 
that the internal capital allocation efficiency effect is a leading factor in improving the acquirers‘ 
excess value following acquisitions. Lastly, operating performance analysis shows that the ICM 
inactive firms have significantly higher EBITD/AT ratio than both the ICM inefficient and 
efficient firms in the pre-announcement year. However, three years after the announcement year, 
these differences become insignificant; moreover, the ICM efficient firms have higher operating 
performance compared to the inactive firms. Regression with the change in operating 
performance from pre-announcement year to three years after indicates that the coefficient on the 
inefficient internal capital allocation component is significantly less than zero when operating 
performance is measured by SALE/AT. Overall, our results indicate that internal capital 
allocation efficiency is a significant factor in the success of acquisition; and that internal capital 
allocation efficiency does translate into efficient external investment decisions.  
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